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L Introduction
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past twenty-five
years. From 225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million
last year. This relentless upward trend is especially striking in light of the
generally high prosperity, low interest rates, and low unemployment during that
period. This anomaly of ever-rising bankruptcy filing rates during a period of
economic prosperity culminated in spring 2005 with the enactment of
comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation that places new conditions on
bankruptcy relief. Although supported by a broad bipartisan consensus on
Capitol Hill, these proposals have been controversial within the academy. Critics
argued that these reforms are unnecessary and punitive, and that private market
adjustments such as higher interest rates and more restrictive credit rationing are
suitable policy responses.
Critics of reform argue that consumer
bankruptcy filings today are caused by
/
the same basic forces that traditionally have caused bankruptcy filings-heavy
household distress caused by overihdebtedness, often combined with unexpected
income or expense shocks, such'as unemployment, divorce, or health problems.
Although this "traditional mo/lel" of consumer bankruptcy explained the world
tolerably well for several decades, it cannot explain the upward trend in
bankruptcy filing rates over the past twenty-five years.' Individuals increasingly
appear to be choosing to file bankruptcy as a response to financial distress, rather
than reducing spending or tapping savings to avoid bankruptcy.
Other scholars have advanced a second approach, an "economic incentives"
model that views the consumer bankruptcy filing decision as a direct and
predictable response to the incentives provided by the bankruptcy law. As will be
1. See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis,99
Nw. U. L. lEv. (forthcoming 2005).
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seen, neither the traditional model nor the economic maximization model can
fully explain the observed pattern of bankruptcy filings. The observed rate is
much higher than the traditional model would predict, and much lower than the
economic maximization model predicts. Moreover, neither model can explain the
dynamic upward trend in filing patterns over time.
But critiquing the prevailing models is insufficient; it is essential to offer an
alternative model that better explains the observed data.2 This Article provides a
new model of consumer bankruptcy that can explain the trends of the past twentyfive years more persuasively than the prevailing models. Anchored in the New
Institutional Economics associated with scholars such as Nobel Laureate
Douglass North and Oliver Williamson, the model offered here sees the rising
consumer bankruptcy rate as reflecting an increasing tendency for individuals to
choose bankruptcy as a response to financial problems. This trend reflects
changes in the institutions and incentives involved in the decision to file
bankruptcy, which have increasingly led Americans to choose bankruptcy in
response to financial distress.
This Article identifies three institutional changes that have contributed to the
increase in consumer bankruptcies over recent decades. First, there has been a
change in the relative economic costs and benefits associated with filing
bankruptcy. The economic benefits of bankruptcy have increased because of the
adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. At the same time, the costs associated
with filing bankruptcy, such as transaction and search costs associated with
learning about and filing bankruptcy, have fallen. Second, there has been a
change in social norms regarding bankruptcy, reducing the shame and stigma that
traditionally constrained bankruptcy filings.3 Third, there has been a fundamental
change in the nature of consumer credit in the economy, which has expanded the
use of general unsecured consumer credit and reduced the use of traditional local
and informal types of credit. This evolution has increased the relative use of
unsecured revolving consumer credit that is dischargeable in bankruptcy, in
addition to eroding many of the informal constraints that restrained bankruptcy
filings, such as trust, repeat-dealing, and the effects of reputation. Ironically,
those who have argued that the expansion of credit card use has contributed to
rising bankruptcy filings may be correct-but for the wrong reason. It is
2. As Kuhn observes, the test of a new theory is whether it explains the observed
evidence better than the prevailing model or "paradigm." THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCiENTnFC REVOLUTIONS 77 (2d ed. 1970).
3. I have elsewhere distinguished these terms: "Personal shame and social stigma go
hand-in-hand. Shame is the internal psychological compass that forces one to keep his word;
stigma is the external, social constraint that reinforces this." Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki,
It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REv. 177, 215 (1999).
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generally assumed that credit cards have increased overall indebtedness and
household financial distress. This is not true, as consumers have simply
substituted credit cards and other modem forms of unsecured credit for other
types of credit, thereby leaving total consumer debt levels largely unaffected. By
substituting more impersonal forms of credit for traditional locally-based credit
relations, however, this evolution has weakened the traditional extralegal checks
on bankruptcy filings. It is argued that this new model of consumer bankruptcy
offered here is both theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.
The Article then briefly discusses some policy implications of the model
described here.4 First, the analysis provides a conceptual justification for many of
the key elements of the bankruptcy reform agenda, which are designed to modify
the incentives and institutions surrounding consumer bankruptcy. Just as the
traditional model manifested itself in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the new model
of consumer bankruptcy is consistent with the recently enacted bankruptcy reform
legislation named the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).5 In that sense, this Article is the first to provide a
comprehensive conceptual explanation for the bankruptcy reform movement.
Ironically, it appears that policy-makers may have recognized what most
bankruptcy scholars have not yet-that we live in a fundamentally new world of
consumer bankruptcy.
Finally, the model presented here raises new questions about the scope of the
fresh-start policy in American bankruptcy law. In particular, by showing that the
bankruptcy decision is to some extent under the control of the debtor and that this
choice is based on unobservable information such as personal commitment to
repayment of financial obligations, the analysis presented here raises new
questions about the mandatory fresh-start policy embedded in American
consumer bankruptcy law.
IL. New InstitutionalEconomics and ConsumerBankruptcy
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates are usually explained according to two
different models.6 The first model, which I have labeled the "traditional" model
4. These policy implications are discussed in greater detail in a subsequent article. See
generally Todd J. Zywicki, The Law and Politics of Bankruptcy Reform (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
5. See generallyBankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2005)).
6. Richard Hynes usefully refers to these as the "distress" and "incentives" models.
Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcyand State Collections: The Caseof the Missing Garnishments,
91 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2006). Others have characterized them as "sociological" and
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(and which others have labeled the "distress" model), views consumer bankruptcies
as arising from household financial distress. Under this model, higher bankruptcy
filings are predicted to be caused by higher levels of household financial distress.
The second model, variously called the "economic maximization" or "incentives"
model, views consumer bankruptcy filings as a direct and predictable response to
the economic incentives provided by the Bankruptcy Code. As the Code increases
the benefits of filing bankruptcy, it is predicted that more consumers will file
bankruptcy. Both claim that bankruptcy filings are caused predictably and largely
exogenously, rather than by a debtor's conscious decisionmaking. Neither can
explain the consumer bankruptcy filing patterns of recent years.
For most of the twentieth century, consumer bankruptcy filings followed a
relatively predictable pattern, rising in times of economic recessions (peaking at the
height of the Great Depression), but then falling to a low, steady-state rate after the
economic crisis abated. Beginning in the 1950s, however, consumer bankruptcy
filings have started to trend gradually upward. Beginning in the 1980s, bankruptcy
filing rates rose more rapidly and began to rise dramatically during the 1990s. After
a brief dip at the end of the 1990s, bankruptcies have surged upward in the new
century, reaching 1.5 million in 2004. These trends are shown in Figure 1:
Figure 1: Bankruptcy Filings, 1947-2004
16
14
.
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Source: Bankruptcy Filings, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts; Number
Households, U.S. Census Bureau
"economic" models. See generally Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological
Approaches to Legal Research: The Case of Bankruptcy, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 685 (1991)
(comparing economic versus sociological approaches to legal research and specifically the
economic model of bankruptcy).
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This upward trend in filing rates has come during a period of unprecedented
economic prosperity. The experience of the 1990s is especially striking given
that bankruptcies surged in the face of low unemployment, low interest rates,
and record-high wealth accumulation due to gains in the stock market and
household real estate holdings.
The evidence indicates that the rise in consumer bankruptcy filing rates is
the result not of greater economic distress, as the traditional model would
predict, but rather from an increasing propensity of American households to file
bankruptcy in response to economic problems.8 In the past, households that
suffered an economic dislocation tended to respond by reducing spending,
tapping savings, taking a second job, and eventually repaying their obligations.
Although many Americans today still respond to financial distress in the same
way, an increasing number are filing bankruptcy and discharging their debts
instead. What is novel are not the underlying problems, but rather the
increasing frequency of Americans choosing bankruptcy as the preferred
response to those underlying problems.
The fundamental problem with the traditional model is that it conflates
two conceptually distinct questions: first, how families get into financial
distress in the first place and second, how they choose to get out of financial
distress. Financial difficulty presents a menu of options in addition to
bankruptcy, from increasing one's income (for example, taking on a second
job), to decreasing one's expenditures (for example, eating out or vacationing
less), to liquidating assets and using the proceeds to pay debts (such as drawing
on savings or moving to a smaller house).
On the other hand, adherents to the economic maximization or incentives
model have found a substantial difference between the bankruptcy filing rates
that would be predicted to result from simple consumer maximizing behavior
and what is actually observed in practice. 9 Estimates are that as many as 1533% of Americans would financially benefit from filing bankruptcy; in
practice, however, only a small fraction actually do so.' 0 Moreover, it is argued
that although the 1978 Code increased the incentives to file bankruptcy, it did
not change the law so dramatically as to explain the subsequent jump in
bankruptcy filing rates. This gap suggests that there must be some sort of
7. See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See Michelle J. White, Why Don't More Households Filefor Bankruptcy?, 14 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 206 (1998) (noting that while at least 15% of American households would

benefit from bankruptcy, only slightly over 1%actually file).
10. See discussion infra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that a large portion of
society could financially benefit from filing bankruptcy).
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extralegal mediating institutions affecting the choice by consumers to file
bankruptcy that are not captured in the neoclassical economic model.
Moreover, in order to explain how changes in these factors have driven changes
in bankruptcy filing rates it is necessary for these factors to be dynamic, not
static. They must be capable of explaining change over time. Given the
absence of any significant amendments to the Bankruptcy Code during the past
twenty years, it is difficult to see how the economic incentives model, standing
alone, can explain a 500% increase in bankruptcy filings during that period."
This suggests that there are some sort of mediating institutional influences that
are not captured in the incentives-based economic model.
Both the traditional and economic maximization models, therefore, suffer
from a common limitation-they both fail to account for the complexity of the
individual decision to file bankruptcy and the institutional framework that
surrounds it. Understanding the bankruptcy filing decision requires an
examination of the consumer bankruptcy institutions that provide the incentives
and constraints on filing bankruptcy, not just the factors that cause the
underlying financial distress.12
In the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, institutions serve
two functions: They provide incentives and they provide a transactional
framework.13 First, institutions provide incentives by channeling individual
behavior in particular directions. For instance, criminal law is an institution
that provides incentives to acquire property by consensual exchange rather than
by theft, channeling behavior toward wealth-creation and peaceful exchange of
property. Second, institutions provide a transactional framework, such as rules
of property and contract, which instruct people on how to coordinate their
affairs so as to accomplish their plans. Contract law, for instance, instructs
people on how to enter into enforceable exchanges of entitlements; property
law instructs people on how to protect their property from the claims of others.
Institutions can be formal or informal. Criminal law is an institution, but so are
11. In addition, as Richard Hynes finds, there also appears to be substantial stability in
nonbankruptcy debt collection rules that have traditionally been thought to lead to bankruptcy,
such as garnishment, suggesting a basic constancy to direct nonbankruptcy incentives as well.
Hynes, supra note 6.
12. Douglass North has defined an "institution" as: "[T]he humanly devised constraints
that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together, they define the incentive structure of
societies and specifically economies." Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through
Time, 84 AMER. ECON. REv. 359, 360 (1994).
13.

DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INsTIrunoNAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE 27 (1990).
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morality and social norms, which also constrain antisocial behavior. Contract
law is an institution, but so is the development of a reputation or trademark that
also encourages the performance of promises even when contract enforcement
is lacking. 14 Thus, institutions provide incentives, but they need not be
consciously designed for that purpose, nor are they necessarily under conscious
design and control.
This Article discusses the institutional changes that have increased the
propensity of Americans to file bankruptcy in recent years. Three general
factors appear to have driven the increase in bankruptcy filing rates in recent
years: (1) changes in the relative economic costs and benefits of filing
bankruptcy; (2) a change in the social norms regarding bankruptcy; and
(3) changes in the nature of consumer credit that have led to an increased
willingness of borrowers at the margin to discharge their obligations in
bankruptcy. Each factor tends to push in the direction of increasing filings.
This Article also reviews the available empirical evidence, which tends to
support the model advanced here.15 It is hoped that by identifying the relevant
factors that may help to explain the bankruptcy boom, this Article will help to
elicit better empirical testing in the future.
III. Changes in the Relative Benefits and Costs ofFilingBankruptcy
The first factor that has contributed to increasing consumer bankruptcies is
a change in the relative benefits and costs associated with filing bankruptcy. In
the past twenty-five years, there simultaneously have been increases in the
economic benefits and reductions in the economic costs of filing bankruptcy. 16
14. See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring ContractualPerformance,89 J. POL. ECoN. 615 (1981) (discussing the enforcement of
contracts by means other than contract law).
15. Most previous empirical study has been grounded in the traditional model of
bankruptcy, and thus does not focus on the factors identified here. Professor Robert Chapman
has observed that statistical analysis of bankruptcy, as with all social science, is heavily
dependent on externally chosen assumptions about conceptual categories and causal
relationships. Robert B. Chapman, MissingPersons: Social Science andAccountingforRace,
Gender, Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 397-98 (2002).
Chapman notes that statistics "[b]oth depend on and create a view of the world." Id. at 397.
16. One could also consider reduced stigma as a reduction in the social "cost" of filing
bankruptcy. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions,82 J. POL. ECON.
1063 (1974) (discussing the concept of social income and its effects on social interactions); see
also Note, A Reformed Economic Model of Consumer Bankruptcy, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1338,
1347 (1996) (noting that although exemption levels have changed, few debtors' decisions are
affected by this change). For purposes of exposition, in this Part I have focused on more
tangible and direct economic costs and discuss the effects of reduced social stigma separately,
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These changes in the relative costs and benefits associated with declaring
bankruptcy create incentives at the margin to file bankruptcy that are reflected
in the increasing bankruptcy filing rates of recent decades.
A. The Economic Benefits of FilingBankruptcy Have Risen
1. The 1978 Code Increased the Economic Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy
It,is 'generally accepted that the economic benefits to an individual from
filing bankruptcy increased with the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
The primary point of disagreement has been the extent to which consumers
have responded to these changed incentives from an economically rational
perspective and whether this change has been good or bad overall from a
normative perspective. 17 Although the evidence of an increased filing effect is
somewhat mixed, most scholars conclude that the enactment of the Code did
have some effect on increasing bankruptcy filings at the margin, although the
changes from previous law8 were not large enough to account for all of the
subsequent rise in filings.'
although those factors could be classified as a relevant "cost" of bankruptcy if one were inclined
to treat it that way.
17. Professor William Whitford has observed that "it is hard to believe that the enactment
of the Code has not had any effect on bankruptcy filing rates." William C. Whitford, The Ideal
of Individualized Justice: Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer
Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 Am. BANKR. L.J. 397,399 n. 11 (1994). Whitford adds:
It is indisputable that consumers can often achieve better economic results through
bankruptcy today than they would have been able to achieve if the law had not been
changed. To assume that this change has had no effect on decisions to file, one
would have to make monumental changes in the usual assumptions about the
responsiveness of humans to financial incentives in commercial matters.
Id.; see also id. at 399 ("The massive revision of the bankruptcy laws in 1978 may also have
been an important factor, because that revision considerably improved the extent ofdebt relief a
typical consumer could obtain through bankruptcy."). For summaries of some of the major prodebtor changes ushered in by the 1978 Code, see Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Incentives
and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice: Evidencefrom the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.
461, 467 (1999); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 34-37 (1995); Kenneth N. Klee, LegislativeHistory of
the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 Am. BANKR. L.J. 275, 275-97 (1980). In congressional testimony
regarding the new amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the American Bankruptcy Institute
acknowledged that the 1978 Code "made bankruptcy a much more debtor-friendly law."
PersonalBankruptcy Consumer Credit Crises: HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm. on
Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of the American Bankruptcy Institute), available at 1997 WL 176645, at *5.
18. Most commentators have concluded that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code has
caused some increase in the bankruptcy filing rate. See F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh
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In fact, recent events have provided a sort of "natural experiment" on the
question of whether individual consumers respond to incentives in deciding
whether to file bankruptcy. Although BAPCPA was enacted in April 2005,
most if its provisions were not scheduled to go into effect for six months, until
October 2005. As a result, during that six-month period, bankruptcy filers
could file under the old rules, with the knowledge that if they were to wait, they
would be required to file under the new less debtor-friendly rules imposed by
BAPCPA, creating incentives for consumers to file bankruptcy sooner rather
than later. Those who believe that consumer bankruptcy is a "last resort"
primarily caused exogenously by consumer debt and other financial obligations
would presumably predict that this grace period would have little effect on
consumer behavior, as no underlying economic risk variable would be likely to
change during that period, such as outstanding debt levels or the propensity to
be unemployed, divorced, or the like. An incentives theory, by contrast, would
predict that consumers would rush to take advantage of the relatively more
generous law before BAPCPA went into effect. In fact, in the quarter
immediately following the passage of BAPCPA, consumer bankruptcy filings
rose dramatically, suggesting that consumers were filing bankruptcy to beat the
effective date of the new law. 19
As originally enacted, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code placed few restrictions
on a debtor's ability to file bankruptcy, regardless of the debtor's need for
Start, 4 S.

CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 76-77 (1995) (noting that bankruptcy rates cannot be
explained by other social and economic variables alone); Lawrence Shepard, PersonalFailures
and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & ECON. 419,437 (1984) (finding additional
bankruptcy filings that would not have occurred in the absence of the 1978 Act); William J.
Boyes & Roger L. Faith, Some Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,29 J.L. & ECON.
139, 148 (1986) (finding that the 1978 Act was a determining factor in the increase in
bankruptcy filings); William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An
Alternative Approach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129, 1130-31 (1983) (noting that the Act may have
marginally increased filings). See generally Richard L. Peterson & Kiyomi Aoki, Bankruptcy
FilingsBefore andAfter Implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Law, 36 J. ECON. & Bus. 95
(1995). Other studies failed to detect a significant increase in filing rates as a result of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari & Lawrence A. Weiss, The IncreasingBankruptcy
Filing Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1993) (noting that the
introduction of the Code did not have a significant effect on the filing rate); Ian Domowitz &
Thomas L. Eovaldi, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Consumer
Bankruptcy, 36 J.L. & ECON. 803, 805 (1993) (finding that the 1978 Act "cannot be established
as the cause" of the increase in filing). For a criticism of the statistical methods used in these
latter two studies, see F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187, 194 n.17 (1998).
19. Press Release, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Number of
Bankruptcy Cases Filed in Federal Courts Up Less Than One Percent for 12-Month Period,
Quarterly Filings up 11 Percent (Aug. 24, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
PressReleases/bankruptcyfilings82405.html.
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bankruptcy relief or ability to repay her debts. The motivation of the drafters of
the 1978 Code is somewhat unclear, but it seems they believed that legal
restraints on debtor opportunism were unnecessary and social and economic
constraints would be sufficient to prevent opportunistic use of the bankruptcy
system.20 Whatever the rationale, the Legislative History to the 1978 Code
states, "The section does not contemplate.., that the ability of the debtor to
repay his debts in whole or in part constitutes adequate cause for dismissal. " 2'
Likewise, insolvency is not required before filing.
Concerned by an immediate surge in bankruptcy filings following the
enactment of the 1978 Code, in 1984 Congress amended the Code to place
some modest limits on the ability of consumers who file bankruptcy
opportunistically. In particular, the 1984 amendments added § 707(b) to the
Code, empowering bankruptcy judges to dismiss a debtor's bankruptcy case if
granting relief would amount to a "substantial abuse" of the bankruptcy system.
In practice, however, this power has been used rarely, sporadically, and
inconsistently to police debtor opportunism. 22 Thus, § 707(b) has done little in
practice to reduce the economic benefits associated with filing bankruptcy, even
for those with high repayment capacity.
It has been estimated by one scholar that with a modest degree of
prebankruptcy planning, more than half of American households could gain
financially from filing bankruptcy, with the financial benefit being greatest for
well-off debtors.23 Calculation of the economic benefits from filing bankruptcy
See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
131-60 (2002) (detailing a history of the enactment of the 1978 Code).
21. Legislative History to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000). For a discussion of the political
developments that led to the emergence of§ 707(b) see SKEEL, supranote 20, at 196-97.
22. Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 248; Todd J. Zywicki, With Apologies to
Screwlape: A Response to Professor Alexander, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 613, 618 (2000).
Professor Jack Williams, for instance, has noted that § 707(b) has been described by many as a
"dismal failure" in preventing abuse. Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric andReality of
Means-Testing,7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 105, 110 (1998); see also Scott Fay, Erik Hurst &
Michelle J. White, The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REv. 706, 707 n.4
(2002) (noting that "later court decisions and lack of enforcement made [the substantial abuse
provision] ineffective"); Wayne R. Wells, Janell M. Kurtz, & Robert J. Calhoun, The
Implementation ofBankruptcy Code Section 707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 15, 42-44 (1991) (recommending that § 707(b) be repealed because ofthe confision it has
20.

AMERICA

caused); Karen Gross, Preservinga Fresh Startfor the IndividualDebtor: The Case ofNarrow
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 95-98 (1986)
(noting the difficulties courts have had in interpreting § 707(b) consistently and in accordance
with its purpose).
23. Michelle J. White, Why It Pays to Filefor Bankruptcy: A CriticalLook at Incentives
Under U.S. BankruptcyLaws and a ProposalforChange, 65 U. CHI.L. REV.685, 706 (1998);
see also White, supra note 9, at 214 (concluding that a minimum of 15% and as much as 23% of
American population could financially benefit from filing bankruptcy); Fay et al., supra note 22,
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also partially explains debtors' choices between Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.24
Overall, there appear to be substantial economic benefits from filing
bankruptcy for many people.
But bankruptcy does not merely give a debtor the opportunity to discharge
financial obligations. There are also intangible benefits associated with filing
bankruptcy that are not found on a balance sheet. The initiation of a
bankruptcy case imposes an automatic stay against all efforts by creditors to
collect pre-petition debts.25 Professor Jean Braucher reports that the primary
goal of bankruptcy filers is "stopping creditors' collection efforts (foreclosure,
repossession, suit, garnishment, phone calls, letters, home visits). ' 26 Second on
the list is "keeping property, often serving as collateral, such as homes, cars and
household belongings., 27 Thus, bankruptcy procedures such as the automatic
stay provide additional economic
benefits from filing bankruptcy above and
28
beyond the discharge itself.
The substantial benefits provided by the current bankruptcy system have
essentially created a sort of arbitrage opportunity for many to gain financially
by filing bankruptcy. The rising bankruptcy rates of recent years provide
evidence that this arbitrage opportunity is gradually being recognized and
exploited by bankruptcy filers. The steady upward trend in bankruptcy filing
rates, rather than an immediate jump, is also consistent with NIE theory. There
are substantial information and transaction costs associated with learning about
and filing personal bankruptcy, which means that consumer response to the
existing arbitrage opportunity will tend to be gradual, rather than immediate, as
at 712 (finding 18% of households in study would benefit financially from filing bankruptcy).
24. See Domowitz & Sartain, supranote 17, at 477-85 (discussing the factors involved in
choosing what chapter to file under). For instance, states with higher state exemption values
appear to have higher rates of Chapter 7 filings relative to Chapter 13 than those with lower
exemptions. Higher exemption values permit debtors to retain more property in Chapter 7; thus,
where exemption values are lower, filers must choose Chapter 13 to retain property. Id.at 48182.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
26. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67
AM. BANKR.L.J. 501, 522 (1993).
27. Id.
28. See Sugato Chakravarty & Eun-Young Rhee, Factors Affecting an Individual's
Bankruptcy Filing Decision (May 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(reporting survey data that the second-most common reason for filing bankruptcy was in
response to lawsuits and collection harassment); see also PeopleBehind BankruptcyNumbers:
PreliminaryResults of Chapter 13 Study in Progress, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on
Admin. Oversight and the Court ofthe Senate Comm. On the Judiciary,105th Cong. 6 (1998)
(testimony of Professor Tahira K. Hira) (reporting results of survey of bankruptcy filers who
state that "no more phone calls from creditors" is a leading reason for filing bankruptcy).
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information percolates through the system. This will especially be the case for
a rare and relatively risky event such as the decision to file bankruptcy.
Economists have modeled the spread of knowledge of an economic
opportunity as following an S-shaped curve. 2 9 At first an innovation is adopted
only by those who have a large amount to gain from behaving differently and
are willing to bear the risk associated with it. As a result, information spreads
slowly at first. At some point, however, the awareness of the new higher-level
equilibrium becomes apparent to others, and knowledge spreads quickly
through~the economy until the new equilibrium level is reached. Where the
gain ,rom adopting the new knowledge is high or the cost30of adopting it is low,
rapidly.
the knowledge will be expected to spread more
In a path-breaking article examining the diffusion of information through
the economy and society, economist Zvi Griliches modeled the spread through
the American farm belt of the development of high-yield hybrid corn during the
mid-Twentieth Century.3' When adopted, hybrid corn increased productivity
by 300 to 1000%.32 Nonetheless, hybrid corn was not introduced immediately
or at the same time in all parts of the country. Rather, its introduction ranged
from the mid-1930s in Iowa to the mid-1940s in Alabama, with several
intermediate states. Once introduced into a region, however, the diffusion of
knowledge of hybrid corn followed a nearly identical S-shaped curve in each
area introduced, starting slowly, then moving dramatically upward before
leveling off at a new higher equilibrium. Once the information was first made
available, Griliches observed, a predictable adjustment path followed that
showed some short-term variation, but which, over time, exhibited more or less
uniform movement toward a new equilibrium path.
It is interesting that Figure 1 above, which plots a curve of bankruptcy
filing rates over the past half century, resembles Griliches's S-shaped curve of
29. See generally Zvi Griliches, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of
Technological Change, 25 ECONOMETRICA 501 (1957); Pauline M. Ippolito & Richard A.
Ippolito, Measuringthe Value of Life Savingsfrom ConsumerReactions to New Information,
25 J. PuB. ECON. 53 (1984). See also Richard A. Ippolito, R. Dennis Murphy & Donald Sant,
Staff Report on Consumer Responses to Cigarette Health Information (Federal Trade
Commission Staff Report, Aug. 1979) (observing gradual spread of knowledge to consumers
regarding health information about cigarettes).
30. Griliches, supra note 29, at 522.
31. See generally id.; Zvi Griliches, Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn
and Related Innovations, 66 J. POL. EcoN. 419 (1958). For a more modem application of
Griliches's model to innovation activity see Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, Grilichesian
(NBER
Breakthroughs: Inventions of Methods ofInventing andFirm Entryin Nanotechnology
2
Working Paper No. 9825, 2003), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w98 5 (last visited
Aug. 18, 2005).
32. Griliches, supra note 29, at 521 n.43.
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transmission of adoption of hybrid corn across the economy, rising gradually at
first but then accelerating over time. There appears to be a more or less
consistent march to a higher equilibrium level of consumer bankruptcy filings,
such that, at some point, the curve will level off at a new higher equilibrium
level, whatever that may be. The new equilibrium has not yet been reached, but
the long-term trend line in bankruptcy filings is exhibiting a predictable rise
toward a new higher equilibrium level.
The Bankruptcy Code provides a type of economic profit opportunity
because many people could benefit financially by declaring bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy filers can protect substantial property through property exemptions.
Moreover, because of the property-based nature of bankruptcy exemptions, this
benefit rises as household wealth rises.33 Because a Chapter 7 discharge
protects future income from creditors, the value of this benefit also rises as
income rises.34 In other words, both high wealth and high income households
have the largest potential benefit from filing bankruptcy, so, counterintuitively,
the upward trends in wealth and income over the past two decades may result in
higher bankruptcy rates by increasing the benefits to bankruptcy filers.
Just as the benefits of filing bankruptcy rise with increasing household
wealth, so do they rise with increasing debt. The greater the amount of
household debt, the greater the benefit of discharging that debt. In fact, there is
an observable correlation between household debt levels and consumer
bankruptcy filings. 35 Adherents to the traditional model have assumed that this
correlation implies a determinate causal direction and have posited that
consumer debt is an exogenous variable that causes bankruptcy filings as an
endogenous variable. But the causal link more plausibly runs the opposite way.
It is unlikely that debt levels are chosen wholly exogenously by consumers;
33. This is because rather than giving a general dollar allowance for exempt property,
exemption regimes enumerate specific exempt property that is thought necessary to the debtor's
fresh start, such as houses, automobiles, and retirement plans. In practice, middle class families
are more likely to own this sort of property and have higher values than lower-income
households, thus the property-based nature of the exemption regime tends to favor upperincome debtors.
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (2000) (exempting future earnings from the bankruptcy
estate). A future income stream constitutes the most valuable asset for the overwhelming
number of people. Buckley, supranote 18, at 67. See generallyJames Davies & John Whally,
Taxes and CapitalFormation: How Important is Human Capital?(NBER Working Paper No.
2899, 1989), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w2899 (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
35. Robert M. Lawless, The RelationshipBetween NonbusinessBankruptcy Filingsand
Various Basic Measures of Consumer Debt, available at http://www.law.unlv.edu/
faculty/rlawless/busbkr/body_filings.htm at 9 (last visited Aug. 18, 2005). The relationship
between total debt and bankruptcy filings is similar. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRuPTCY
REvmw COMMISSION 85 (1997).
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rather, debt levels are partly endogenous, reflecting the ease with which these
obligations can be discharged in bankruptcy. 36 In turn, high levels of
household debt increase the economic benefit of filing bankruptcy by
permitting the discharge of more debt. 37 As total debt rises, bankruptcy
becomes more attractive, because it increases the benefit received from a
bankruptcy discharge. The benefits rise still further in a system like America's,
which permits bankruptcy filers to pick and choose which debts they want to
pay, providing the option, for instance, to reaffirm some debts (such as
38
mortgages and car loans), but to discharge others (such as credit cards). If
causation ran in the direction postulated by the traditional model, then the
correlation between debt and bankruptcy should also be reflected in more
conventional measures of indebtedness-such as the debt-service ratio and
balance sheet insolvency-which account for factors such as interest rates and
household assets. But it does not.39 The correlation between debt and
bankruptcy is apparent, but the causal explanation proposed by the traditional
model appears to be incorrect.
The assertion of the traditional model, that consumer debt provides a
causal explanation of the bankruptcy filing rate, is a classic manifestation ofthe
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy4--namely, that an observed correlation
results from an assumed, rather than demonstrated, causal relationship. But
there is no a priori reason to assume that causation runs in the direction
assumed by the traditional model, nor is there corroborating empirical evidence
to support this causal inference. The correlation between total debt and
bankruptcy, therefore, may be more plausibly attributed to the increased benefit
that a bankruptcy discharge provides for highly indebted consumers. Reducing
the benefits of bankruptcy, therefore, probably would decrease consumer
demand for debt, and increase the willingness of creditors to lend. The overall
effect on household debt levels is thus indeterminate.

36. Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supranote 1.
37. See Chakravarty & Rhee, supra note 28, at 12 (finding increase in likelihood of
individual filing bankruptcy as benefit rises, as measured in terms of dollar amount of debts
discharged under bankruptcy protection net of nonexempt property).
38. See Scott F. Norberg, ConsumerBankruptcy's New Clothes: An EmpiricalStudy of
Dischargeand Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 415, 461 (1999)
(noting that debtors in bankruptcy repay very little unsecured debt, but pay a nontrivial
percentage of secured debt through reaffirmations and the like).
39. See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
40. See James Tobin, Money and Income: PostHoc Ergo PropterHoc?, 84 Q. J. EcON.
301, 302-03 (1970) (discussing perils of inferring determinate causal relationships from
correlations).
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2. The Role of PropertyExemptions
The 1978 Code also enlarged one of the more important benefits
governing bankruptcy filings, the structure of property exemptions in
bankruptcy.4 ' Exemptions govern the amount and type of property a debtor can
retain when she files bankruptcy. Exemption law has traditionally been a
creature of state law, rather than federal law. The 1978 Code, however, added
an additional slate of federal exemptions, giving filers a choice of exemption
regimes (except in states that have "opted-out" of the federal menu and require
debtors to use the state exemption regime instead).42 The Code, therefore, left
unaffected the exemption regimes in place for filers in opt-out states, but
increased the benefits for those filers who now have a choice between the state
and federal slates of exemptions.
State variation in exemptions means that the relative economic benefits
accruing to debtors from filing bankruptcy will vary across the country.43
Debtors in states with more generous exemption law regimes will be able to
keep more property in bankruptcy than those in states with less generous
exemption laws, increasing incentives at the margin to file bankruptcy relative
to debtors living in less-generous exemption states. There is some empirical
evidence that individuals do respond to these incentives and that more generous
exemption laws lead to increased bankruptcy filings at the margin. 44 Moreover,
there appears to have been a tendency for property exemptions to rise in recent
years, through both a steady increase in the dollar value of exemptions (several
states have recently created homestead exemptions or increased the cap on their
homestead exemptions), and the creation and recognition of new categories of

41.

See Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A TheoreticalInquiry, 29

J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 608-09 (2000) (discussing the theoretical effects of changes in the size and

type of exemptions).

42.

11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000).

43. See generally Richard Hynes et al., The PoliticalEconomy of PropertyExemption
Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19 (2004).
44. See generally White, supranote 23 (arguing that the incentives of bankruptcy should
be reformed in order to discourage opportunistic bankruptcy filings). On the other hand,
although the impact of exemptions is positive, it appears to be modest in magnitude, probably
because residents of high-exemption states generally have less access to credit ex ante, which
dampens some of the direct benefit of filing. See Note, supra note 16, at 1347 (summarizing
studies and noting that the effect of exemption levels is significant, but small); Kartik Athreya,
Fresh Start or Head Start? Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions and Welfare (Aug. 12, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also Reint Gropp et al., PersonalBankruptcy
and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. ECON. 217, 219-20 (1997) (finding that credit is
more expensive and less available in high-exemption states).

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY REFORM

1087

exempt property, especially new or expanded exemptions for retirement
accounts.45
This expansion in the value of exemptions may explain some of the
increase in consumer bankruptcy filings, especially when combined with other
developments. Household wealth and household bankruptcies have both
increased dramatically during the past few decades. Household wealth has
exploded, going through several periods of rapid wealth accumulation.4 6 In
fact, after remaining relatively stable for over half a century, household net
wealth began to rise rapidly in the 1970s, accelerated in the 1980s, and
exploded in the 1990s. Consumer bankruptcy filings also rose steadily and
dramatically during that same time. In the mid-I 990s, for example, household
net wealth grew by about 10% per year, even as consumer bankruptcies jumped
as much as 20% per year. Moreover, the ratio of consumer credit to household
net worth has remained almost perfectly constant at 4% of net worth since
1956. 47 This combination of rising bankruptcies and rising personal wealth
contradicts the hypothesis that mounting bankruptcies reflect increased
household financial distress, but is consistent with the view that consumers can
shield more wealth in bankruptcy. The sources of the rise in net wealth have
varied over time, but, in general, there have been large rises in the value of
residential real estate (throughout the period) and financial assets (particularly
during the stock market boom of the 1990S).48
The steady increase in home property values over the past thirty years has
increased the effectiveness of the homestead exemption by increasing the
amount of wealth available to be protected in bankruptcy. Some cases
involving homestead exemptions have been quite egregious, allowing debtors
to pour massive amounts of wealth into a homestead exempt in bankruptcy,
often on the eve of bankruptcy. 49 Although homestead exemptions in general
45. For a comprehensive survey of state policies related to exemptions, see generally C.
Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper: ERISA, The Bankruptcy Code andState Exemption Laws
for IndividualRetirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65 (2003).
46. Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
47. Thomas A. Durkin, Discussion: The Evolution of Consumer Credit in the United
States, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 40 fig. 4 (Thomas A. Durkin &
Michael E. Staten eds., 2002). Not coincidentally, this ratio is also consistent with the long run
estimated marginal propensity to consume out of household wealth, which has been stable
between 3-5% for many years. Zywicki, EconomicAnalysis, supra note 1.
48. Joanna H. Frodin, Commentary: Is the Savings Rate Really Negative? (Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Sept. 10, 1999) (identifying three distinct consumer wealth
"booms" over past 30 years); William G. Gale & John Sabelhaus, Perspectives on the
HouseholdSavings Rate, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 181,200-02 (William

C. Brainerd & George L. Perry eds., 1999).
49. GAO Finds Some Floridaand Texas Debtors Have Expensive Homes, CONSUMER

1088

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1071 (2005)

have become more valuable, the impact of the unlimited homestead exemption
on bankruptcy filings is relatively trivial. Fay et al., for instance, conclude that
if a cap of$ 100,000 were imposed on the amount of equity one could protect in
a homestead, filings would be reduced by only about 6,000 per year (out of 1.5
million). 50 The reason for this is obvious-few bankruptcy filers have more
than $100,000 in equity in their homes. On the other hand, the aggregate value
of all homestead exemptions is significant. 5'
The increase in wealth from the increased value of financial assets has also
52
increased the effective value of bankruptcy-exempt retirement. plans.
Although there is little systematic empirical evidence on the effect ofi more
generous treatment of retirement savings on bankruptcy filing rates, anecdotal
evidence through case filings suggest that it is becoming increasingly common
for bankruptcy filers to have substantial amounts of excepted or exempt
pension plans at the time of filing bankruptcy. One bankruptcy judge observed
in a case a few years ago: "[N]otwithstanding that many debtors have such
substantial unsecured consumer debt, few seem to own (or report) any
significant nonexempt tangible personal property, but many report substantial
exempt retirement funds (IRA, 401K or Keough accounts)."5 3 In that case, for
instance, one of the debtors was a successful doctor who had amassed interests
in IRA, ERISA, Keough, and other exempt pension plans of over $390,000 and
nonetheless sought relief in Chapter 7.54 The Bankruptcy Court took the
debtor's large exempt pension assets into account in dismissing the case for
substantial abuse, a decision that was later affirmed by the Second Circuit. 55
Other cases have involved Chapter 7 debtors who had accumulated $200,000,56
BANKR. NEWs, Aug. 12, 1999, at 1, 6; ProtectingRichBankrupts,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at

A-20.
50. Fay et al., supra note 22, at 715-16.
51. See Andreas Lehnert & Dean M. Maid, Consumption, Debt, and Portfolio Choice:
Testing the Effect ofBankruptcy Law 31 (Federal Reserve Board Working Paper No. 2002-14,
2002) (concluding that reducing all state homestead exemptions to the average level of the
lowest quartile of states would be predicted to reduce filings by 18%), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2002/200214/200214abs.htrnl.
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(c)(2) (2000) (allowing debtors to retain interest in trusts that are
transfer restricted); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (concluding that
debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan can be excluded from the bankruptcy
estate).
53. In re Carlton, 211 B.R. 468, 475 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1997).
54. Id. at 471.
55. See Kornfield v. Schwartz, 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that even
though the pension plan was exempt property, the Bankruptcy Court acted within its discretion
in considering it under the totality of the circumstances test for substantial abuse).
56. In re Summer, 255 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000).
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$285,000, 57 and $96,00058 in exempt pension plans that were either excepted or
exempt in bankruptcy. In another case, a doctor filed bankruptcy after being
sued for $160 million in damages for the debtor's intentional sexual abuse. 59
The debtor proposed a Chapter 13 plan to pay them $45,000 over a five-year
plan period, while at the same time, he held three exempt IRAs with a total
value of $1.4 million. 60 The court held that debtor was not required to include
any of the $1.4 million or income derived from it in his "disposable income" for
purposes of his Chapter 13 plan payment obligations. 6 1 This combination of
rising financial assets and expanding exemptions for retirement plans has
increased the financial benefit of filing bankruptcy, especially for wealthier
debtors.
B. The Economic Costs of FilingBankruptcy Have Fallen
The economic costs of learning about and filing bankruptcy have also
fallen over time, thereby causing increased bankruptcies. This cost reduction
has taken a number of different forms, including reductions in the search costs
of learning about bankruptcy and the transaction costs of filing bankruptcy. At
the same time, increases in the availability of sub-prime and home equity
secured lending have reduced the costs of obtaining credit following
bankruptcy. These various reductions in the costs of filing bankruptcy have
also increased incentives at the margin for higher bankruptcy filing rates.
Given the substantial economic benefits available to bankruptcy filers, even a
small decline in the relative costs of filing bankruptcy could be expected to
elicit a substantial increase in the number of bankruptcy filings.62
It should be stressed at the outset that a decline in search and transaction
costs for filing bankruptcy is generally considered a good thing from a
normative economic perspective, even though it increases bankruptcy filings.
The relevant policy concern is not the total number of bankruptcy filings per se,
but rather an efficient level of bankruptcy filings that accurately matches actual
bankruptcy filings with those who society determines should be entitled to
57. In re Dabbas, 2000 WL 33672948, at *1 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 24, 2000). The court
made no mention of the pension in dismissing the case for substantial abuse. Id. at *4.
58. In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 27, 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).
59. Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995).
60. Id. at 1131.
61. Id. at 1132-33.
62. David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal
Bankruptcy and Delinquency, 15 REv. FIN. STUD. 319, 320 (2002).
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bankruptcy relief, while limiting fraud and abuse. Rationing access by high
search and transaction costs, therefore, furthers no coherent or persuasive goal
as a matter of social policy. Leaving aside the normative question of where to
draw this line between access and minimizing abuse, it is first necessary to
understand as a positive question how reduced search and transaction costs
translate into increased bankruptcy filings.
1. DecliningSearch Costs
Bankruptcy relief can be extremely beneficial to many of those who file
and many American families could benefit financially by filing bankruptcy.
But there are also costs associated with pursuing bankruptcy. Most notably,
debtors must become aware of bankruptcy as an option and the benefits it
provides. Information about the benefits of bankruptcy is not free, thus a
debtor must undertake some effort to learn about bankruptcy before filing. In
economics, this concept is referred to as "search costs." As the search costs of
learning about bankruptcy relief fall, debtors will tend to increase their demand
for bankruptcy, thereby increasing the number of bankruptcies. Today,
individuals receive information about bankruptcy from a large variety of
sources-including attorney advertising, celebrity reports, and from friends and
family-suggesting that the search costs of bankruptcy have fallen in recent
years.
Attorney advertising about bankruptcy is much more widespread than in
the past.63 There is some evidence that the extent of attorney advertising of
bankruptcy services is correlated with the number of bankruptcy filings in the
relevant community, but the direction of the causal influence is ambiguous. 64
On the other hand, there is ample empirical evidence that, in general, attorney
advertising tends to increase the demand for lawyers' services. 65 There is no
63. Coincidentally, at almost the same time the Code was amended, the Supreme Court
held that attorney advertising is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, thereby
legalizing attorney advertising. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
64. SMR Research "did a brief study of telephone book ads and found that cities with
high bankruptcy filing rates usually do have higher levels of lawyer advertising than cities with
low filings rates." The Rise in PersonalBankruptcy: Causes andImpact, Before the Subcomm.
on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998)
(testimony of Stuart A. Feldstein, President of SMR Research), availableat 1998 WL 105080,
at * 18-19. The causal link is ambiguous, however, because it is not clear whether these lawyers
are responding to extant demand for attorney services to file bankruptcy, creating demand for
bankruptcy filings through informative advertising, or both.
65. See generally WILLIAM J. JACOBS ET AL., IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL
SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 172 (FTC Staff
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reason to believe that demand for bankruptcy would be inconsistent with this
general model, which suggests advertising generates increased bankruptcies.6 6
Figure 2 is suggestive of a relationship between bankruptcy filings and
advertising for legal services:
Figure 2: Bankruptcy Filings and Attorney Advertising
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Report 1984); Terry Calvani et al., Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar,41 VAND.
L. REv. 761 (1988); John Schroeter et al., Advertising andCompetition in Routine Legal Service
Markets: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 49 (1987); Timothy J. Muris & Fred
McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services, 1979 AM. BAR FOUND.
RES. J. 179 (1979); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should be Allowedto Advertise:
A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1084 (1983); George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 (1961); Lester G. Telser, Advertising and
Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537 (1964). Advertising can have two distinct effects, either
increasing the market demand for a particular product category (i.e., cars, shoes, legal services)
or merely shifting demand among different brands within a given product category (i.e., Ford v.
Chevrolet, Nike v. Adidas). Todd J. Zywicki et al., Obesity and Advertising Policy, 12 GEO.
MASON L. Rev. 979, 1000-01 (2004). The empirical analyses cited conclude that advertising
about the availability of legal services predominantly has the former effect of increasing market
demand and overall use of legal services rather than simply shifting market share among
different law firm suppliers of legal services.
66. A study by Visa reported that 19% of bankruptcy filers learned about bankruptcy
through attorney advertisements. Vern McKinley, BallooningBankruptcies: IssuingBlamefor
the Explosive Growth, REGULATION, Fall 1997, at 33, 38.
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Figure 2 does not purport to demonstrate a causal relationship between
bankruptcy filing rates and attorney advertising, but in the absence of
systematic data on the scale of attorney advertising, this may be illustrative of
the level of information available to consumers through advertising.67 On that
basis, at least, it seems that there is some ground for encouraging further
research regarding the empirical relationship between attorney advertising and
consumer bankruptcy filings.
There is also anecdotal and qualitative evidence that attorney advertising
probably increases bankruptcy filings. Consumer bankruptcy lawyers report
that they make substantial use of advertising in attracting new clients.68 Indeed,
several of the consumer bankruptcy lawyers interviewed by Braucher in her
1993 study had hired marketing firms to shape their advertising and marketing
strategies. 69 At a minimum, consumer bankruptcy lawyers generally place
display advertisements in the Yellow Pages, but also often advertise in major
newspapers.7 ° Some even run television and radio advertisements, while some
use direct mailings to persons whose homes have been publicly listed for
foreclosure. 7' Braucher concludes that the modest investments made in
advertising had been more than recouped by fees generated by clients.72
Yellow Page advertisements are reported as the top source of clients in
Braucher's study.73
That information costs about bankruptcy are a significant barrier to filing
bankruptcy is evidenced in Braucher's observation that one of the biggest
difficulties for a lawyer meeting with a new client is persuading the client that
the bankruptcy system truly is as generous as it seems to be-i.e., there is no
67. There are a number of qualifications to Figure 2 that should be noted. First, the
amount of money spent on attorney advertising is for all legal services, not just personal
bankruptcy services. Nonetheless, casual empiricism suggests that personal bankruptcy is one
of the more heavily advertised forms of legal services, especially on television. Second, these
figures represent only expenditures on television advertising, and therefore, do not reflect
amounts spent on other forms of media, such as radio, print, the Yellow Pages, and Internet. On
the other hand, personal bankruptcy advertisements are represented in those media as well,
seemingly at least to the same extent as on television, and perhaps more. Third, the causal link
is indeterminate-increased attorney advertising may be a reflection of increased bankruptcy
filings, rather than a cause. Due to these necessary qualifications, it would be imprudent to
draw firm conclusions from the observed correlation between personal bankruptcy filings and
attorney advertising.
68. Braucher, supra note 26, at 543.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 543-44.
Id. at544.

72. Id.
73. Id.
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"catch. ' 74 The ease and generosity of the current system defies individuals'
expectations about what could be expected from bankruptcy. "People are
pleasantly surprised" about what they can do in bankruptcy, lawyers reported.75
One lawyer observed that Chapter 7 "sometimes seems to debtors to be 'too
good to be true; they can't believe it."' 7 6 Some actually expressed concern
about the implications of the widespread knowledge of bankruptcy's benefits;
one observed, "if Americans in 7general
knew what you can do in bankruptcy,
7
then we'd really be in trouble.
A recent spate of high-profile celebrity bankruptcies has also increased
public awareness of the benefits of bankruptcy. The list includes celebrities
such as Toni Braxton, Kim Basinger, Burt Reynolds, M.C. Hammer, 78 and,
most recently, boxer Mike Tyson.79 Many lawyers, in fact, identify these
famous bankrupts in order to persuade clients of the social acceptability of
filing bankruptcy.80 Although the direct impact of this publicity is hard to
measure empirically, it certainly contributes to public awareness of bankruptcy
and increases the social acceptance of bankruptcy generally.
Perhaps more important in increasing public awareness of the substantial
benefits of bankruptcy is "word of mouth" as a result of the sheer number of
bankruptcies, which surpassed 1.5 million households last year and continues to
rise. 8 1 The large numbers of bankruptcy filings means that, over time, almost
everyone has come into contact with the bankruptcy system, either by filing
themselves or by knowing a friend or family member who has filed. This
phenomenon is known as a "contagion" or "herding" effect in economics, or
less formally, as a "water cooler" effect.82 As more people file bankruptcy,
there are more people in the populace to tell their friends and relatives about the
74. Id.
75. Id. at 554.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Joshua Wolf Shenk, Bankrupt Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 16. In fact,
Mr. Hammer spoofed his bankruptcy filing in several television ads that aired during the 2005
Super Bowl.
79. Tyson Filingfor Bankruptcy, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 2003, at 17.
80. Braucher, supra note 26, at 509 ("[Some debtors'] lawyers... in essence try to give
their clients 'permission' to opt for quick discharge in chapter 7... by naming famous people
who have received a bankruptcy discharge.").

81.

Mamie Marcuss, A Look at HouseholdBankruptcies, COMMUNITIES & BANKING 15,

17 (Spring 2004).
82. See also Fay et al., supra note 22, at 710 (discussing how people who have been told
by friends or relatives how quick and easy the bankruptcy process is are more likely to file
bankruptcy).
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benefits of bankruptcy. As a result, the cost of learning about bankruptcy
decreases, resulting in more bankruptcy filings. This second wave of filers
comes into contact with yet more potential filers and describes the process to
them. This self-reinforcing dynamic creates a hydraulic upward pressure on
bankruptcy filing rates. Surveys of bankruptcy filers reveal that friends and
family are the single most important source of information about bankruptcy
and that a majority of bankruptcy filers knew a friend or family member who
had filed bankruptcy. 83 Consistent with the model, the number of people who
first heard about filing bankruptcy from a personal acquaintance also seems to
be rising over time. 84
2. Declining Transaction Costs
The transaction costs associated with filing bankruptcy have also declined
in recent years, in major part, as an outgrowth of the increase in filings. A large
and steady flow of consumer bankruptcy filings has made possible the
establishment of certain economies of scale and specialization that decrease the
marginal cost of processing bankruptcy cases, such as capital investments in
electronic technology and specialized paralegals. As the costs of processing
bankruptcy cases fall, demand for bankruptcies will tend to rise.
In particular, so-called bankruptcy "mills" have evolved, that produce
bankruptcy cases as largely standardized commodities. Their practice is a highvolume, repetitive one. Making heavy use of technology that allows them to
generate "cookie cutter" bankruptcy pleadings, these mills have been able to
drive down the cost of filing bankruptcy substantially. Using teams of
paralegals and secretaries to supplement their efforts, these attorneys represent
hundreds of debtors per year.85 Most lawyers in high-volume practices meet
83. See Jones & Zywicki, supranote 3, at 212-13 (summarizing studies); Braucher, supra
note 26, at 544 (reporting that many client referrals come from more people telling relatives,
friends, and co-workers about their bankruptcies); McKinley, supra note 66, at 38 (noting the
results of a Gallup poll that found 51% of bankruptcy filers had a close friend or relative who
filed bankruptcy previously and a Visa survey of bankruptcy filers that found 45% of filers
learned about bankruptcy from friends or family).
84. See BankruptcyLaw Revision Before the Subcomm. on Commercial andAdmin. Law
ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. 8 (1998) (testimony of Mallory B. Duncan,
Vice President, General Counsel of National Retail Federation) ("[O]ne recent study found a
five hundred percent increase in less than two years in the number of filers who say they first
heard about the idea of filing from a friend or relative.").
85. In 1981, only 4% of debtors were not represented by an attorney. TERESA A.
SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN
AMERICA 23 (1989). By 1991-92, however, paralegals in one California district prepared 14%
of consumer filings. Susan Block-Lieb, A ComparisonofPro Bono RepresentationPrograms
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only once with the client before filing a bankruptcy petition; few meet more
than twice. 86 For those who do not want to or cannot pay for a lawyer, "do-ityourself' bankruptcy books have become a staple of bookstores and even
grocery store check-out lines. Huge amounts of information about bankruptcy
are also available on the Internet, including all of the forms needed to file
bankruptcy.
The high volume of consumer bankruptcy filings has made it possible for
certain lawyers to establish practices focused on high-volume, repetitive
cases. 87 This specialization has allowed these firms to realize economies of
scale and to make capital investments that have driven down the marginal cost
of filing bankruptcy. 88 As these transaction costs of filing bankruptcy have
fallen, the decreased price has created incentives for higher bankruptcy filing
rates. The large number of filings has also indirectly increased the benefits of
filing. Historically, a "substantial abuse" action under § 707(b), could be
brought only by the United States Trustee or a Bankruptcy Judge; thus, the
rising number of filings dramatically decreases the scrutiny that can be applied
to any particular case, increasing the possibility of abuse.89
3. GreaterAvailability of Post-BankruptcyCredit
Traditionally a major cost of filing bankruptcy was the perceived negative
effect it had on access to credit following bankruptcy. 90 Indeed, traditionally it
for ConsumerDebtors, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 37, 40 (1994); see also Geraldine Mund,
Paralegals:The Good,the Bad,and the Ugly, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 337,340-41 (1994)
(discussing the role of paralegals in the bankruptcy process).
86. Braucher, supranote 26, at 554-55.
87. This development in the economics of legal practice is not unique to bankruptcy.
Similar developments have occurred in many other areas of legal practice. See David A. Hyman
& Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Limited Performance Agreements and the
Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 959, 975-77 (1998) (discussing
competition in legal and other professions).
88. I have not located any direct evidence on changes in the price of filing bankruptcy
over time, but it is generally accepted that this is the case and I have seen no evidence
inconsistent with that observation. See Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance
Function of Consumer Bankruptcy (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see also
Buckley & Brinig, supranote 18, at 195 (discussing costs and competition in the provision of
bankruptcy services); Gross & Souleles, supra note 62, at 320 (noting that many analysts
believe that a decline in the cost of filing is a factor in the increase in filing).
89. The BAPCPA substantially expands the list of parties empowered to bring an abuse
challenge under § 707(b) to include any party in interest.
90. Today, filing bankruptcy remains on one's credit rating for ten years. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681c(a)(1) (2000).
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was perceived that filing bankruptcy would cripple the ability to acquire new
credit following bankruptcy. Today, however, there have been changes in
credit markets that have made credit more available to former bankruptcy filers.
One survey done a decade ago found that over 16% of bankruptcy filers were
able to gain unsecured credit within one year after filing bankruptcy and over
55% within five years. 9' A more recent survey finds that three-quarters of
92
bankruptcy filers have at least one credit card within a year after filing.
Bankruptcy filers are able to gain access to a broad cross-section of revolving
credit, such as bank cards, department stores, gas cards, and finance companies,
as well as installment lenders.93 In fact, the figure would probably be higher
today as a result of the growth in the subprime lending market which has
created an entire industry that caters to consumers with damaged credit.
The traditional belief that bankruptcy filing would restrict access to credit
following bankruptcy no longer constrains a debtor's behavior to the degree it
once did. To be sure, the debtor will likely suffer some penalty as a result of
having a bankruptcy filing on her credit rating. Nonetheless, developments in
credit markets mean that this hardship is no longer as severe as it once may
have been. As a result, this too has reduced the effective costs associated with
declaring bankruptcy.
IV. Changes in Social and PersonalNorms Regarding Bankruptcy
Increasing bankruptcy filing rates can also be explained by changes in
social and personal norms regarding bankruptcy. There is a widespread
perception that bankruptcy has lost some of its previous social stigma and that
this has contributed to the increase in bankruptcy filing rates.94 Federal
91.

See MICHAEL STATEN,

THE IMPACT OF POST-BANKRUPTCY CREDIT ON THE NUMBER OF

BANKRUPTCIES 10-11, (Credit Research Ctr., Krannert Graduate Sch. of Mgmt.,
Purdue Univ., Working Paper No. 58, 1993) (arguing that for various reasons this estimate
probably underestimated access to credit at that time), availableat http://www.msb.edu/prog/
crc/pdf/wp58.pdf.
PERSONAL

92.
93.

VISA, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY: ANNUAL BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR SURVEY

94.

For instance, in his floor statement on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, Senator

(1997).

STATEN, supranote 91, at 11-12.

Charles Grassley referred to a public opinion poll that indicated that fully 85% of Americans
believe that bankruptcy has less social stigma than in previous eras. Professor Braucher also
quotes numerous lawyers who opine that the increase in bankruptcy filing rates has been driven

in part by a decline in the traditional social stigma associated with filing bankruptcy. See
Braucher, supra note 26, at 540 ("Many lawyers said the sense of social stigma about
bankruptcy has been waning in recent years.. . ."); id. at 545 (noting the declining social stigma
attached to bankruptcy). This concern about the decline in the social stigma regarding
bankruptcy and its impact on bankruptcy filing rates has been remarked upon by both
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Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, for instance, has stated bluntly, "[p]ersonal
95
bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their sense of shame.
The impact of a decline in personal shame and social stigma on bankruptcy
filing rates is straightforward. A reduction in the generalized social stigma
associated with filing bankruptcy will reduce the negative impact that an
individual will suffer to his personal reputation by filing bankruptcy, making
individuals more willing to file. As bankruptcy becomes a less socially
stigmatized activity, the reputational harm from filing bankruptcy falls as well,
creating a vicious cycle of eroding norms and rising bankruptcy filings. In fact,
it is not even necessary that the actual stigma attached to filing bankruptcy
decline, so long as potential bankruptcy filers perceive that there has been a
reduction in the stigma attached to filing bankruptcy.
A. Consequences of Change in Social Norms RegardingBankruptcy
The negative social and economic effect of changes in social norms
regarding bankruptcy is amplified because it disproportionately affects a
discrete category of individuals who have the most to gain financially by filing.
Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, the economic benefits of filing bankruptcy
tended to rise as the filer's income and wealth rose because exemptions were
linked to specified types of property deemed essential to the debtor's fresh start,
such as houses, cars, and certain other property. Because the financial benefit
of bankruptcy is largest for high-income and high-wealth debtors, the
importance of social norms in restraining bankruptcy filing is also highest for
this same group. If those constraints weaken, therefore, the impact at the
margin in terms of higher filings will be largest for high-income and highwealth individuals.9 7
Although the theory is straightforward, empirically measuring changes in
broad and diffuse social factors such as shame and stigma is difficult, and does

Republican and Democratic leaders. See Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Social Norms in
Bankruptcy, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIIUES INLAW (forthcoming 2005) (quoting Senators Grassley,
Hatch, Kerry, and other leading members of Congress); see also Charles A. Luckett, Personal
Bankruptcies, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 47, at 73 ("It is widely recognized,
though hard to measure, that the stigma of bankruptcy is not what it used to be .....
95. Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT'LJ. 870, 871 (1997).
96. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the higher economic
benefits of filing bankruptcy associated with higher income and wealth).
97. As will be discussed, this interaction between social norms and economic benefits
provides part of the justification for the legal changes effected by BAPCPA.
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not easily lend itself to direct testing. 98 For instance, it is not methodologically
correct to simply ask those who have already filed bankruptcy whether they felt
"ashamed" or perceived social disapproval before doing so.99 For analytical
purposes it is completely beside the point whether people feel remorse after
they actually file bankruptcy; what matters is whether the stigma is sufficiently
strong to deter them from filing at all, or perhaps even more importantly, to
encourage them to live a sufficiently prudent life such that financial crises are
less likely to arise. The argument is that the constraining effect of shame and
stigma has gradually declined at the margin, reducing the psychological cost of
filing bankruptcy and making some people more willing to file than they
otherwise would be, not that the shame and stigma associated with bankruptcy
have been completely eliminated or that those who actually file bankruptcy do
not feel ashamed anymore.
A direct test of the effect of personal shame and social stigma on
bankruptcy filings, therefore, is essentially impossible. Such a test would
require identifying those marginal individuals who would have filed bankruptcy
but for the negative effect on his conscience or reputation from doing so.
Because these individuals never show up in bankruptcy court, it is almost
impossible to identify this group of people for research purposes. Even more
difficult to identify would be that category of individuals who respond to the
reduced shame associated with bankruptcy by living closer to the financial edge
than they otherwise would. Nonetheless, if social norms have changed, there is
little doubt it would lead to increased filings.
Social norms are a low-cost mechanism for promoting social order and
discouraging anti-social behavior. Norms substitute for more formal economic,
political, and social institutions, such as police and courts. For instance, a
society that develops and maintains a social norm against property theft (in
addition to having a police force that prevents theft) will achieve more social
order at less expense than a society that can prevent theft only through the
98. See Luckett, PersonalBankruptcies, supra note 94, at 76 (noting that "none of the
typically cited social or legal factors are easily quantifiable"); Gross & Souleles, supra note 62,
at 321 ("The various costs of default, especially social, legal, and information costs, are
inherently difficult to measure. Most of the proxies that have been suggested run into problems
of endogeneity and reverse causality."); David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of
ConsumerBankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 326 (1999)
("stigma is very difficult to measure").
99. Nonetheless, some scholars have done exactly that. See, e.g., Constance M. Kilmark,
Inside the World ofthe TroubledDebtor, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 257, 262 (2001) (noting the
shame felt by debtors in interviews); see also ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI,
THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 73-75
(2003); TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 32
(2000) (describing feelings of shame felt by those who have filed bankruptcy).
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I00 In order to
maintenance of a large police force with no norm against theft.
attain the same degree of social harmony, it will be necessary to support a larger
police force in the latter society as compared to the former. A reduction in the
constraining force of a pro-social norm, such as financial responsibility and
promise keeping, therefore, will impose costs on society, both in the form of
reduced social harmony and lower levels of economic exchange, and in the
expense of constructing and operating more formal institutions, such as police.
It is difficult to quantify the full costs to the American economy and
society of the decline in social norms against bankruptcy. The experience of
Memphis, Tennessee, however, is suggestive. In 1996, 4.3% of Memphis
families filed bankruptcy, almost 1 in 23, earning Memphis the sobriquet of the
"bankruptcy capital of America." 10 1 According to a Fortunemagazine article,
there is a "culture of bankruptcy" in Memphis, and bankruptcy is "a way of
life.' 0 2 As the magazine notes, "[b]ecause so many people have lived through
bankruptcy, there's a strong informal support network for anyone in financial
trouble. 0 3 Friends and neighbors tell each other 'bankruptcy works,' says
David Monypenny, Jerry Lee Lewis's [who also filed for bankruptcy]

manager. ''

°4

Other indicia of an active bankruptcy culture are prominent.

"There's also plenty of professional support for bankruptcy: The Memphis
Yellow Pages features more than a dozen large lawyers' ads offering to wipe
out debts for no down payment; a Honda dealer (its slogan: 'The bankruptcy
specialists') runs TV commercials promising to sell you a car no matter what
your credit history."'10 5 But the costs are also significant. Consider Fortune's
description of everyday financial life in Memphis: "It's almost impossible to
cash checks in Memphis. Used-car dealers charge their wholesale cost as a
down payment. And lenders are either tightening or giving up. First Enterprise

100.

An analogy is the well-established finding that voluntary norms of tax compliance

substantially reduce the amount of resources that the Internal Revenue Service has to expend on
audits, enforcement, litigation, and other compliance measures. If voluntary tax compliance
were to fall, this would require greater expenditures on enforcement tax-compliance by the
federal government. See generally Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax
Compliance,86 VA. L. REv. 1781 (2000); James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance,36 J. ECON.
LIT. 818 (1998).
101. Kim Clark, Why So Many Americans Are GoingBankrupt,FORTuNE, Aug. 4, 1997, at
24.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Financial Group, for instance,' an
Illinois-based sub-prime lender, closed its
6
Memphis operations in May. "1
As this example suggests, a decline in norms discouraging bankruptcy
thus has two effects: a deadweight loss from the reduction of mutuallybeneficial trades, and a reduction in economic efficiency as a result of
increasing reliance on "self-help" ex ante measures by lenders to offset the
lower reliability of financial contracts. Given the variety ofpossible responses,
it may be difficult to estimate the full social loss that results from these various
offsetting costs. More formal institutional responses, such as large down
payments and higher interest rates can provide some response to fill the vacuum
created by the breakdown of informal bonds of trust, but these deadweight
losses and ex ante adjustment costs fall on innocent and opportunistic
borrowers alike.
B. EmpiricalEvidence of Effects of Changes in Norms on Filings
Because of the inability to measure changes in social norms directly,
indirect proxies have been used to try to test for the effect of changes in social
stigma regarding bankruptcy, primarily by trying to isolate the features of
"bankruptcy cultures" that exhibit persistently high filing rates after controlling
for other economically relevant variables.' 0 7 Using district-level data, Fay,
Hurst, and White find that after controlling for other relevant variables, there
are systematic patterns of higher filing rates in particular districts, either
because the higher level of filings increases the available information about
bankruptcy or because the prevalence of bankruptcy in the community reduces
the stigma attached to filing.10 8 Gross and Souleles use similar statistical
measures, and similarly find that after controlling for economic risk, the
probability that a given individual will file for bankruptcy is, in part, a function
of the number of people who filed for bankruptcy in the recent past in that

106. Id.
107. For a review and critique of several of the studies discussed here, see Gordon
Bermant, What's Stigma Got to Do with I?, Am.BANR. INST. J. 22, 22 (July/Aug. 2003). See
generally Kartik Athreya, Shame as it Ever Was: Stigma andPersonalBankruptcy, 90 FED.
RES. BANK RICHMOND EcON. Q. 1 (Spring 2004) (arguing that a decline in stigma increases
bankruptcies but has an ambiguous effect on consumer debt).
108. Fay et al., supra note 22, at 712; see also id.
at 716 ("These results are consistent with
local trends occurring in which increases in a district's bankruptcy filing rate cause attitudes
toward bankruptcy to become more favorable and therefore individual households' probability
of filing rise.").
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community.'1 9 This correlation in filing rates, which cannot be explained by
economic risk variables, suggests the presence of a stigma or information effect
in local communities. 10
Empiricists have also tried to test for the effect of stigma on bankruptcy
filings by examining quantifiable proxy variables for the strength of social
norms generally, such as examining the size and stability of the relevant
community to determine if bankruptcy filing rates differ according to
community size. If a fear of social disapproval deters bankruptcy filing, then
bankruptcy filings should be higher in larger, more anonymous communities
than in smaller communities. Residents of larger communities are likely to
possess less knowledge of their neighbors' reputations and are also less likely
to fear their disapproval. In fact, cities with higher population densities have
higher bankruptcy filing rates than smaller communities."' This finding is
consistent with more general studies that find that individuals living in small
towns tend to be both more trusting and more trustworthy than those from big
cities. 1 2 These factors indicate that norms of trust and trustworthiness are
higher in small communities, suggesting that the conditions necessary for trust
and reciprocity to flourish (repeat-dealing and reputational mechanisms) are
present in these communities.
Societies with higher patterns of migration also tend to have higher
bankruptcy filing rates, presumably because more transient populations will
tend to have more attenuated social ties, less concern about social reputation,
and weaker norms.1 13 Repeat dealings will be of shorter duration and subject to
a higher discount rate than in more stable societies. Where conditions make
109. Gross & Souleles, supra note 62, at 340.
110. Id. at 345 ("The fact that the omitted default factor rises with the number of people in
one's state who have previously filed for bankruptcy is suggestive of a decline in social stigma
or information costs, but it is not conclusive."). Note, this same finding may also support the
evidence of reduced information costs or the "water cooler" effect, as it is difficult to distinguish
the effect of interpersonal transmission of information about bankruptcy from interpersonal
transmission of information about norms.
111. John M. Barron et al., Monitoring the Household Sector with Aggregate Credit
Bureau Data, Bus. EcoN., Jan. 2000, at 63, 71; Luckett, supra note 94, at 85.
112.

See PETER SINGER, How ARE WE To LIvE? ETHIcs IN AN AGE OF SELF-INTEREST 141-

42 (1993) (noting studies indicating that character traits such as the ability to manipulate and
deceive other people are more common and pronounced among people living in larger cities);
MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 70 (2000) (contrasting the character of people found in
large cities with those in small towns and rural areas); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL
221-22 (1998) (discussing the negative cultural influences of large cities).
113. See Buckley & Brinig, supra note 18, at 89-94 (discussing the relationship between
immigration and bankruptcy); SuLLIvAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE, supra note 85, at 244-46
(discussing the role social and demographic factors play in the bankruptcy filing decision).
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detection and monitoring of neighbors' reputations difficult, social norms will
be less powerful in discouraging disapproved behavior. Thus, in high
migration areas, where individuals frequently move in and out of the
community in a short time frame, it is difficult for social stigma to punish those
who behave improperly, thereby reducing the incentives of others to collect and
act on reputational information.
Scholars have also measured the influence of norms on bankruptcy rates
by the statistical residual that remains after controlling for all other variables
that might otherwise be thought to explain bankruptcy filings. Empirical
studies of bankruptcy filing rates consistently find large, unexplained statistical
residuals after controlling for all other economic variables. These statistical
residuals could result from a number of possible causes, but many have
attributed them to a change in social norms. As economist Charles Luckett
observes, "Of course, to the extent that a model is comprehensive in its
incorporation of likely determinants of bankruptcy, declining stigma may be left
as the most plausible candidate to account for the otherwise unexplained
component of rising bankruptcies." '" 4 Even Moss and Johnson, who continue
to adhere to the traditional model that rising bankruptcies are caused by rising
consumer indebtedness, acknowledge that there has been a dramatic upward
surge in the "multiplier" effect of the relationship between debt and bankruptcy
filings since 1985.115
Finally, Professor Rafael Efrat has ingeniously tried to measure the change
in social norms regarding bankruptcy through an examination of press
characterization of the bankruptcy system and bankruptcy filers from 1864 to
the present. 16 Efrat finds a dramatic change in the characterization of
114. Luckett, supranote 94, at 89. It may be that declining stigma is the most plausible
explanation for some cases but not others. For instance, it may be that declining stigma is the
most important factor for middle-class and upper middle-class filers who have the most to gain
financially from filing bankruptcy and have access to the greatest amount of information
regarding bankruptcy. With respect to lower-income individuals, by contrast, it may be that
they are most affected by the reduction of transaction costs and search costs discussed above,
rather than changes in social norms. To the extent that disapproval of bankruptcy reflects
middle-class bourgeois values, it may be more constraining on middle-class families than poor
families. See also Todd J.Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV.L. &
POL. 393, 402-08 (2001) (discussing the effects of changing levels of social trust); Chapman,
supranote 15, at 355 (discussing the effects on commerce of moral and social virtue). Given
the difficulty of measuring changes in these diffuse social and economic variables in the first
place, efforts to establish the relative importance ofthese variables within different demographic
subgroups is even more daunting.
115. Moss & Johnson, supra note 98, at 326-31 (calling the "rapid growth" of the
consumer bankruptcy multiplier since 1985 "both striking and unprecedented").
116. Efrat, Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 94.
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bankruptcy filers beginning in the 1960s. "Prior to the 1960s," he observes,
"newspaper articles depicted the debtors largely as manipulators and fraud
promoters. Debtors in bankruptcy were represented as a manifestation of
decline of societal moral values and were frequently referred to as evil doers,
dishonest, cheaters, crooks, fools, or perjures."" 7 Beginning in the 1960s,
however, "bankruptcy petitioners were no longer regularly referred to as
deceitful. Instead, the newspaper articles have begun referring to the petitions
merely as irresponsible or unethical individuals who lack discipline."" 8 He
adds, "For the first time, petitioners were depicted in newspaper articles using
compassionate sentiments. Petitioners were referred to as hardworking, poor,
struggling, and needy."" 9 During this same time period, newspaper articles
ceased attributing bankruptcy filings to debtors' fraud, but instead portray
bankruptcy as resulting from events beyond the debtors' control.' 20 Efrat
concludes that this change in the characterization of bankruptcy debtors reflects
an underlying change in the public perception of bankruptcy and bankruptcy
filers that is consistent with a change in social norms regarding bankruptcy.121
Efrat suggests that the shame associated with bankruptcy has continued to
decline since that time. For instance, he reports that a study from the 1960s
found that almost a quarter of the petitioners felt ashamed about filing
bankruptcy filers
bankruptcy. 22 But by 1995, however, only 10% of surveyed
23
1
bankruptcy.
filing
for
shame
felt
they
that
indicated
C. Causes of Changes in Social Norms RegardingBankruptcy
The reasons for the erosion of the traditional stigma of filing bankruptcy
are multiple and difficult to pin down with precision. Providing a theory of the
evolution of social norms over time is beyond the scope of this Article. Social
theorists, however, have long struggled with developing a theory of how social
norms are created and evolve over time, so any observations here are
necessarily speculative. If there has been a change in social norms, the
explanation may rest in deep-seated changes in American culture that have
tended to erode the value of promise-keeping and performing one's obligations
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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generally, which might be reflected in changing attitudes regarding
bankruptcy. 124 McCloskey, for instance, argues that there has been a general
attrition of broadly-accepted middle-class values of "bourgeois virtue" that
praised thrift and personal responsibility,
and condemned bankruptcy, divorce,
25
and other similar behaviors.1
With respect to bankruptcy specifically, complaints about the supposed
"decline in stigma" regarding bankruptcy have recurred many times in
American history. 126 The question, therefore, is whether there really has been
tangible a change in social norms regarding bankruptcy during the past twentyfive years, and if so, why has such a dramatic change occurred in such a short
period of time? Given the difficulty in understanding such broad social
currents as changes in social norms, the discussion presented here is necessarily
tentative. Nonetheless, given the importance of the issue and a widespread
perception that it is indeed an important element of the explanation of rising
bankruptcies, the issue merits some discussion.
One possible explanation turns on the generational change associated with
the rise of the "Baby Boom" generation to a position of leadership in American
society. 12 Changes in broad social norms tend to occur only gradually, 28 but
sociologist Robert Putnam has argued that the transition from the World War HI
generation to the Baby Boom generation marked a dramatic change in
American life, in particular with respect to attitudes toward social engagement
and personal responsibility. 129 Although an overgeneralization, the Baby Boom
generation has been notable in its willingness to challenge established

124.

See ROBERT H. BORK,

SLOUCHING

TOWARDS GOMORRAH:

MODERN LIBERALISM AND

AMERICAN DECLINE 64-65 (1997) (discussing the decline of traditional morality in recent
decades); ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 325 (1987) (discussing the

decline of traditional morality). See generally Buckley & Brinig, supra note 18.
125.

Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM.

SCHOLAR

177, 177-78 (1994).

126. See Moss & Johnson, supra note 98, at 312-22 (reciting a recurrent theme of
complaints associating rising bankruptcy with a decline in social stigma about bankruptcy). See
generally

LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM:

CONSUMER CREDIT

A

CULTURAL HISTORY OF

(1999) (describing the recurrent "myth of lost financial virtue" in United

States history).
127. See Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law, supranote 114, at 410-13 (discussing the role of the
Baby Boom generation). This is also consistent with Efrat's finding that there was a dramatic
change in the social perception of bankruptcy in the decade of the 1960s. Efrat, Evolution of
Social Norms, supra note 94. Efrat observes that there was a "growing tendency in society
beginning in the 1960s to generally shift blame for individual failure away from the person and
towards environmental factors.... " Id.
128.

129.

See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990).
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 249-50 (2000).
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traditional American values, good and bad.130 Thus, there has been general
overturning of traditional taboos regarding issues as varied as marriage,
sexuality, recreational drug use, and the role of women in the economy and
society.131 Moreover, given the very size and self-confidence of the Baby
Boom generation, they have arguably been able to influence social norms to a
greater degree than most generations. The Baby Boom generation has served as
a sort of collective "norms entrepreneur" for widespread changes in a variety of
traditional social norms. 32 It may be that these broad social changes also
tended to undermine social norms regarding personal financial responsibility
and the social stigma associated with bankruptcy. 33 Earlier generations seem
to have held a much more negative view of the personal shame and social
stigma associated with bankruptcy than do the baby boomers.' 34 Although
these observations fall far short of a rigorous proof of the possible relationship
between the rise of the Baby Boom generation and the decline in stigma
beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, they are consistent with other characteristics
of the Baby Boom generation, as well as providing at least one 35possible
explanation as to the specific timing of this change in social norms.
The specific bankruptcy filing patterns of baby boomers is consistent with
these more general observations. Baby boomers are dramatically overrepresented in bankruptcy filings relative to their percentage in the
population' 36 Sullivan observes that "[t]he overrepresentation of the baby
130. PAUL C. LIGHT, BABY BOOMERS 115-17 (1988).
131. See generally Editorial, Review & Outlook: No Guardrails,WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
1993, at A12.
132. In this vein, it has been observed that with respect to social attitudes toward divorce,
"'the oldest baby boomers were at once deviant and trend setters ...[who] helped to establish
new normative societal standard that permit a generally high rate of divorce."' LIGHT, supra
note 130, at 147 (quoting Census Bureau experts Arthur Norton and Jeanne Moorman). For
more on norms entrepreneurship, albeit in a different context than here, see Robert C. Ellickson,
The Marketfor Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 1, 10-17 (2001). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms andSocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 929-30 (1996) (discussing
"norm entrepreneurs" who can help society reach "a 'tipping point' when norms start to push in
new directions").
133. See Michael J. Boskin & Lawrence J. Lau, An Analysis of U.S. PostwarConsumption
and Saving: PartH EmpiricalResults 72-76 (NBER Working Paper No. 2606, 1988) (finding
that "vintage effect" of baby boom generation explains decrease in U.S. savings rates over time).
But see Barry Bosworth et al., The Decline in Saving: Evidencefrom HouseholdSurveys, 1991
(No. 1) in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTwrrY 183, 199 (arguing that cohort effect
predated baby boom generation).
134. See, e.g., TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEsT GENERATION 39-44 (1998) (describing World
War II Veteran Wesley Ko's refusal to file bankruptcy); id. at 47 (describing James Dowling).
135. David Frum, Bankruptcy Reform is a Morallssue,WALL ST. J., Feb. 11,2000, at A14.
136. Although baby boomers comprise only 39% of the American population, they are
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boom [generation in bankruptcy] is striking." 137
In addition, the
overrepresentation of baby boomers in bankruptcy has been following them
through their economic life-cycle, indicating that the tendency toward
bankruptcy is a reflection of factors unique to their generation, not a function of
more generic passage through age and financial life cycle.' 38 When they were
the 25-34 year-old cohort of the population, they were the largest single group
in bankruptcy and had the highest filing rate. Ten years later, when they were
aged 35-44, they were again the largest group in bankruptcy and had the
highest filing rate. 39 Moreover, because the baby boomers are such a large
cohort, the spike in bankruptcy filings among their generation counts for about
14% of the growth in the filing rates, certainly enough of a critical mass to
move social norms. 140 Baby boomers have matured during a period of
economic growth and record wealth accumulation, so it is doubtful that their
high filing rate reflects unusual levels of economic stress, especially compared
to earlier generations such as the Great Depression. This persistent record of
unusually high bankruptcy filings is consistent with the impression that the
Baby Boom generation has effected a dramatic change in social norms, for both
good and bad, including traditional norms condemning bankruptcy.
The unique baby boomer effect on changing social norms about
bankruptcy is reflected in the difference between their filing rates and
subsequent generations as well. Whereas baby boomers have filed bankruptcy
at much higher rates than the rest of the population at large in every stage of
their life-cycle, the early evidence is that the per capita filing rate among
members of so-called "Generation X" is lower than that of the baby boomers at
the same stage of their life cycle. 141 According to researchers, members of
Generation X appear to be more financially and socially responsible and
55% of bankruptcy filers.

SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 99, at 39. In
fact, the representation of baby boomers in bankruptcy may be as high as 63%, depending on
the dates used to describe the Baby Boom generation. Id. at 304 n.38.
137. Id. at 39.
138. Id. at 39-41. Similarly, the disproportionately large number of bankruptcy filings
among baby boomers is reflected in a shift in the average age of bankruptcy filers toward middle
age, tracking their movement through their economic life cycle. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al.,
Young, Old,and In Between: Who Filesfor Bankruptcy? 9 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR 1,2-3
(Sept. 2001) (noting statistics showing the baby boomers high filing rates at various ages).
139. Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Baby Boomers andthe BankruptcyBoom, 4 NORTON BANKR.

L. ADVISOR 1, 3 (1993).
140. See id. at 4 (noting that twenty-somethings appear to be following the filing patterns
of baby boomers).
141. Sullivan et al., Young, Old, and in Between, supra note 138, at 2 (noting a 7.2%
decrease in the rate at which debtors under the age of twenty-five file bankruptcy from boomers
to Generation X).
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traditionalist than the Baby Boom generation, which may reverse or slow some
42
of the baby boomers' effects on changing social norms regarding bankruptcy.1
On the other hand, although Generation X's bankruptcy filing rate is lower than
the boomers', it still remains high by historical standards, suggesting that the
baby boomers have left a permanent mark on the nation's social norms
regarding bankruptcy, and 14that
generational change will not reverse the
3
underlying change in norms.
The intervention of bankruptcy attorneys may also play a role in eroding
personal shame regarding bankruptcy. In general, debtors' attorneys seem to be
somewhat more hostile toward creditors than are their clients and are especially
dismissive of the belief that there is a moral, as opposed to purely legal,
obligation to repay creditors. Thus, Professor Braucher's interview subjects
express frustration regarding their clients' belief that they have a moral
obligation to repay the debts they have incurred. Much of the counseling that
goes on between debtors' attorneys and their clients seems to revolve around
this desire to counsel the client out of his moral desire to repay his debts. One
lawyer observed, "some people feel there is a moral issue; frankly I don't."' 44
Another lawyer stated:
My attitude is-the law is there. The credit card companies charge 20%
interest. Discharge is a risk of doing business. I don't feel bad about it.
Some debtors feel so harassed. Some debtors say they feel bad about
discharging debt, and I wonder if they do. Some are overly emotional, and
I'm thinking, 'What's the big
deal?' Especially with credit cards-it's not
145
like a friend or a relative.
Many attorneys attack the moral and trust basis of the debtor-creditor
relationship by contrasting this obligation with others that are generally
regarded as having greater moral weight. "A number of lawyers in the study,"
Braucher reports, "said that they find themselves trying to talk debtors out of
[the desire to repay their debts in] chapter 13. They use such tactics as raising
the question of their clients' moral obligations to their families, especially to

142. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 114, at 412; see also NEIL HOWE & BILL
STRAUSs, 13TH GEN: ABORT, RETRY, IGNORE, FAIL? 114-20 (1993) (discussing the financial
trends among Generation X); NEIL HOwE & BILL STRAUss, MILLENNIALS RISING: THE NEXT
GREAT GENERATION 263-86 (2000) (discussing commerce and finance as it pertains to
Generation X). See generallyFRANCIS FuKuYAMA, THE GREAT DIsRuPTION: HUMAN NATURE
AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999) (predicting return to traditional social norms
following "great disruption" of recent decades).
143. Sullivan et al., Young, Old, and in Between, supra note 138, at 3.
144. Braucher, supra note 26, at 523.
145. Id.
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their children, in order to diffuse clients' sense of moral obligation to repay
creditors.' 46 When the moral obligation to pay creditors, especially distant
institutional creditors, is pitted against the moral obligations owed to one's
family, it is evident that the latter obligation will almost always prevail.' 47
A change in social norms regarding bankruptcy also may, to some extent,
be a consequence of the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. A
diminishment of the stigma associated with filing bankruptcy was implicit in
the 1978 Code. The Code expanded the nondiscrimination provision of § 525
to prohibit many forms of private discrimination and virtually all forms of
public discrimination against bankruptcy debtors.148 The Code also purged the
normatively laden but ancient term "bankrupt" from the Code, substituting the
more value-neutral term "debtor."'149 Similarly, a case filing is now described
generically as an "order for relief.'1 50 The intent ofthese semantic changes was
in part to strip bankriptcy of moral and emotional baggage that had previously
interfered with a straight financial calculation.' 5' To the extent that legal rules
have an "expressive" function in shaping social norms, it is possible that these
semantic changes and the behaviors they regulate could also have the52effect of
reducing general attitudes of opprobrium toward bankruptcy filers.
146. Id. at 509.147. See Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape, supranote 22, at 614 (noting that debtors
are expected to perform unless it would result in injustice or undue hardship to their family); see
also Todd J. Zywicki, Evolutionary Psychology and the Social Sciences, 13 HUMANE STUD.
REv. 1 (2000) (noting the inherent preference for one's family over strangers), available at
http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2000).
149. Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 219.
150. Id.
151. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Paragraph (12) defines 'debtor.' This is a change in
terminology from present law, which calls a person that is proceeding in straight bankruptcy
liquidation case the 'bankrupt'... . The general term debtor is used.., as a means of reducing
the stigma connected with the term bankrupt."); see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., I st
Sess. 40-42 (1981 ) (testimony of Professor Jonathan Landers) (stating that the substitution of
term "debtors" for "bankrupts" in 1978 Bankruptcy Act reduced the stigma associated with
filing for bankruptcy). Efrat observes that France, Germany, and Holland have recently
renamed their bankruptcy process as "debt settlement" in order to reduce the stigma traditionally
associated with filing bankruptcy. See Efrat, Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 94 (citing
Nick Hulls, Overindebtedness and Overlegalization: Consumer Bankruptcy as a Fieldfor
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 143, 144 (1997)).
152. See generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics,27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998) (developing an economic theory of expressive law). See also Efrat, Evolutionof Social
Norms, supra note 94 (noting decline in Scotland of social stigma regarding bankruptcy
following change in terminology from "bankrupt" to "debtor" in the mid 1980s (citing Bill
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The sheer number of filers alone has also probably tended to reduce the
stigma associated with filing bankruptcy. As more individuals file
bankruptcy, more people know others who have filed bankruptcy. The
recognition that others have filed bankruptcy and have survived-in many
cases prospered-makes bankruptcy more routine in society, reducing the
stigma associated with it. Thus, the sheer numbers of individuals who file
bankruptcy contribute to the perception that bankruptcy is a common and
routine process. 153 As the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed in
a famous article, society can only define so much of a given behavior as
"deviant."' 54 Once a behavior becomes sufficiently widespread society
redefines the behavior so as to relieve it of its "deviant" label, thereby
implicitly tolerating previously inappropriate behavior. 55
Thus, as
bankruptcy becomes more common, especially among the middle class, it
may lose some of its previous "deviant" social character and become more
socially acceptable.
The problem of enforcing traditional social norms may also be made
more difficult by the existence of celebrities and others who publicly flout
those norms. As noted, there have been several high-profile celebrity
bankruptcies in recent years, which have arguably contributed to the sense
that the bankruptcy stigma is eroding. These celebrities may be unintentional
"norms entrepreneurs" who subtly shift patterns of behavior in society.
Similar views are expressed by more pedestrian bankruptcy filers, a large

McBryde, The Scottish Experience of Bankruptcy, in INsOLVENCY LAW THEORY & PRACTICE
117, 123 (Harry Rajak ed., 1993))).
153. Thus, the argument regarding declining stigma and rising bankruptcy rates is not
circular, as argued by some, see SULLrvAN ET AL., FRAGiLE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 99, at 265,
because this feedback loop takes place gradually and over time. Social norms do not change
immediately and all at once, and bankruptcy rates do not immediately jump to a higher
equilibrium level. Instead, there is a gradual unraveling over time, as higher filings and
declining stigma create a feedback loop. See generally COLEMAN, supra note 128.
154. Daniel PatrickMoynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. ScHoLAR 17, 19 (1993).
155. Id. One bankruptcy filer confessed in a CNN interview, "When I found out---this was
watching it on the news, on the newspapers-that more and more people are doing it [filing
bankruptcy], and.., it's not just a middle class you know, upper class too-rich peopleeverybody's doing it. And... I said: Why not me? You know, I'm just one more of them."
Your Money with John Metaxas (CNNfn television broadcast, Jan. 18, 1999). In fact, whereas
bankruptcy itself was once thought a deviant activity, today it is only bankruptcy fraud and
abuse by rich filers that is thought of as deviant, and some bankruptcy scholars appear to have
doubts about even this. See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGVENESS 244-45 (2000)
(criticizing efforts to place any legal limits on access to bankruptcy for even high income and
wealthy debtors).
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number of whom report that filing bankruptcy was fast,
156 easy, and painless
and that they would consider filing again if necessary.
This is not to say that changes in social norms regarding bankruptcy are
automatic or immediate. Filing bankruptcy and breaching the obligations of
reciprocity strongly contradicts our inherent tendencies toward reciprocity
and promise-keeping. 157 To the extent that negative social norms and other
incentives break down these innate cooperative tendencies, they generally do
so only after long-lasting and intense pressure. 158 It would be inaccurate
today to say that society actively encourages filing bankruptcy, but it seems
accurate to characterize attitudes as drifting toward benign tolerance, thereby
leading to increasing bankruptcies. To the extent that this drift continues, it
could create a vicious cycle, further undermining social norms and leading to
still higher bankruptcy filings.
V Changes in The Nature of Consumer Credit
A final contributing factor to the rise in bankruptcy filing rates in recent
years is a change in the nature of consumer credit and in consumer credit
relations. Consumer credit institutions have changed in a number of ways
that, at the margin, would be expected to destabilize traditional debtorcreditor relationships and thereby increase bankruptcy filing rates. Many of
these changes have been inevitable-they are the unintended side-effect of
technological and economic changes that have created a more economically
efficient consumer credit system. From an economic perspective, they are
beneficial and should be encouraged, even though a side-effect is that these
same forces tend to undermine many of the traditional mechanisms for
restraining opportunistic breaches of credit contracts and have tended to exert
upward pressure on bankruptcy filing rates. So long as the overall benefits of
more efficient credit markets exceed the costs of increased bankruptcies, this

156. See McKinley, supra note 66, at 38 (describing findings ofa Visa survey that "66% of
filers found the bankruptcy process to be an easy one" and that 27% of respondents would
consider filing again); Efrat, Evolution of Social Norms, supra note 94, at n.244 (citing VISA,
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 19 (1997) ("For others the decision to file for
bankruptcy was actually reinforced by friends and relatives. They reported knowing many other
people, including relatives and close friends, who had filed for bankruptcy or had urged them to

do so.")).
157. See generally Todd J.Zywicki, The Reciprocity Instinct (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
158. See generally Kevin McCabe, Fiat Money as a Store of Value in an Experimental
Market, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215 (1989).
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is a positive development. The policy question is how to devise the set of
institutions that maximizes the benefits of these financial innovations while
minimizing the costs associated with higher bankruptcies.
A. The Shift to Credit Cards and UnsecuredConsumer Credit
A general shift toward greater use of unsecured credit, such as credit
cards, has increased the frequency of bankruptcy. Recent decades have seen a
shift in consumer credit toward unsecured credit, primarily in the form of
general purpose bank credit cards. Unsecured credit-such as credit cards and
medical bills-is generally dischargeable in bankruptcy absent a particular
limitation imposed by bankruptcy law.159 By contrast, a bankruptcy discharge
is of little use to a debtor with respect to secured credit, such as home
mortgages, home equity loans, security interests in personal property, layaway
plans, or pawn shops. Bankruptcy discharge will also not help a debtor with
informal credit arrangements such as loans from family members, which was
historically the dominant source of consumer credit. 160 Holding everything else
constant, as debtors make greater use of unsecured credit relative to secured
and informal credit, the value of the bankruptcy discharge will also increase.
As the value of the bankruptcy discharge increases, debtors will have a greater
incentive to file bankruptcy.
Although credit card use has risen dramatically during this period,
contrary to conventional wisdom there is little evidence that credit cards have
increased overall consumer indebtedness. Rather the increase has primarily
been a substitution of credit card debt for other types of consumer debt.
Although this may seem irrational at first glance given the seemingly "high"
interest rates charged on credit cards, consider that the alternatives may include
pawn shops, personal finance companies, retail store credit, and layaway plans,
all of which are either more costly or otherwise less attractive than credit
cards.161 Credit cards are also generally less expensive for lenders to issue,
which is reflected in the overall price of credit cards relative to these other
forms of credit. The result, therefore, has not been to increase household
indebtedness, but primarily to change the composition of debt within the
159.

11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000).

160.

See CALDER, supra note 126, at 60-64 (discussing the role of lending between friends

and family).
161. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 79, 94-110
(2000) (discussing credit cards and the types of alternatives that credit cards replace).
Presumably there has been a substitution for informal credit as well, such as family loans and
pawn shops, but there is little data on the amount of informal borrowing in the economy.
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household credit portfolio. 162 The substitution has increased the use of
"revolving" credit card debt, which a borrower can revolve from month to
month, and decreased "installment" debt-such as car loans, credit from
retailers (such as furniture stores), and personal finance loans-where the
debtor borrows a fixed amount of money and repays it in fixed installments
over a fixed period of time.
Figure 3 shows that the increase in credit card debt is offset by a reduction
in other traditional forms of consumer installment debt:
Figure 3: Consumer Credit Oustanding as Percentage of
Disposable Personal Income, 1959-2003
0.25
0.2

0.15

Total/DPI
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0
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Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis
As Figure 3 indicates, the growth in revolving (credit card) debt over the past
thirty years has clearly been a substitution from nonrevolving consumer debt to
revolving debt, thus leaving overall consumer indebtedness (as a percentage of
disposable income) largely unaffected. 63 Revolving debt outstanding has risen
162. The reduction in transaction costs and availability of credit on more competitive terms
would, of course, have an implicit wealth effect, shifting out consumer budget constraints and
enabling marginally more borrowing. But because they would also be wealthier, consumers
could borrow more without increasing their effective debt burden, thus, this increase in
indebtedness would not be expected to have any greater correlation with bankruptcy. In fact,
the debt-service and debt-to-asset ratios have remained largely constant during recent years,
further confirming the idea that the increase in new forms of credit are largely a substitute away
from old forms of debt. Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
163. See also Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and ConsumerAttitudes, 19702000, 86 FED. REs. BULL. 623, 623-24 (2000) (noting that total consumer credit outstanding
has risen in tandem with income growth); Durkin, supranote 47, at 38, 39, fig. 2 (noting that the
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64
during this period from zero to roughly 9% of disposable income.
Nonrevolving installment debt, by contrast, has fallen from its level of 19% of
disposable income in the 1960s, to roughly 12% today. Thus, the increase in
revolving debt has been almost exactly offset by a decrease in the installment
debt burden. In fact, the recent bump in total indebtedness in recent years was
not caused by an increase in revolving debt, which has remained largely
constant for several years, but by an increase in installment debt, primarily as65a
result of a recent increase in car loans for the purchase of new automobiles.
Because the increase in credit card usage has resulted primarily from a
substitution of credit cards for other types of consumer credit, rather than an
overall increase in indebtedness, there is little indication that increased use of
credit cards1 66has precipitated greater financial stress among American

households.

Unlike traditional forms of consumer credit, however, credit card and
other unsecured debt is generally unsecured and dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Thus, holding total debt constant and substituting dischargeable unsecured debt
for nondischargeable forms of debt will increase the propensity of a given
individual to file bankruptcy. This may explain the observed tendency of credit
card defaults and defaults on other forms of unsecured consumer debt to track
bankruptcy filing rates, whereas there seems to be no similar correlation
ratio of consumer credit to income has remained relatively stable since 1956).
164. In fact, this figure probably overstates the amount of revolving debt held by American
households. The majority of credit card users are convenience users who use credit cards as a
transactional device and pay their balances in full each month, rather than revolving. The
percentage of convenience users relative to revolvers has risen steadily over time as credit cards
have replaced cash as a transaction mechanism. Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, supra
note 161, at 101; Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. FamilyFinances: Evidence
from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. REs. BULL. 1, 25 (Jan. 2003)
(reporting that 55.3% of households pay their credit card bills in full each month). Nonetheless,
during that thirty-day cycle-period, convenience users are measured statistically as having
outstanding credit balances that are added into the calculation of revolving debt. As William
Hampel observes, "[s]ome people have large balances every month, but also pay their balances
in full every month. This exaggerates the size of revolving credit as a proportion of total credit
and underestimates the amount of payments that take place each month." William Hampel,
Discussion: The Growth of Consumer Credit and the Household Debt Service Burden, in
("Very simply, revolving credit...
IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supranote 47, at 67; see also id.
is not all debt. I do not know of any data source that tells us how much of current revolving
credit is merely transaction balances.").
165. Aizcorbe et al., supra note 164, at 24. In particular, the growing popularity of sport
utility vehicles, which are both more expensive and more valuable than traditional cars, thus,
they simultaneously increased indebtedness and increased household assets through their
purchase. Id.at 17.
166. See Hampel, supra note 164, at 67 ("[C]onsumer credit has been fairly constant
relative to income over the past 30 years, but the composition has changed.").
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between bankruptcy filings and defaults on home mortgage loans or secured
auto loans. 16 7 For unsecured debts, the debtor can discharge the debts in
question at little cost, whereas in the latter case the debtor will suffer the high
cost of losing his house or car. If bankruptcies were best explained as an
involuntary response to adverse economic shocks, it would be expected that
defaults on mortgage, automobile, and credit card debt should be rising more or
less in unison, because there would be no obvious reason why an individual
would be "unable" to pay some debts but not others. Given the different
default rates on these various forms of credit, it is evident that consumers are
consciously choosing to pay some debts but not others--defaulting on their
unsecured obligations, but paying their secured debts. Thus, the recent shift by
consumers toward unsecured debt, primarily as the result of greater use of
credit cards, would tend to increase bankruptcy filing rates by increasing the
percentage of debt that is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
In addition, there is some evidence that bankruptcy filers tend to increase
their credit card balances in the period leading up to bankruptcy.' 68 Credit card
debt rises rapidly and is concentrated in the months immediately preceding
bankruptcy, suggesting that credit card indebtedness does not cause bankruptcy
in many cases, rather the debtor is already on the way toward bankruptcy when
credit card borrowing begins and is either acting strategically as part of a credit
card "bust out" or is simply drawing on credit cards as a last resort. Regardless,
the effect is to dramatically increase credit card use during a time when the
debtor knows she is either going to file bankruptcy eventually or is likely to do
SO. 169

It also has been argued that credit cards have contributed to increased
bankruptcies through a profligate expansion of credit card credit to high-risk
borrowers, especially low-income borrowers. 170 Although often-repeated,
167. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and
Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 250 (1997) (finding a correlation between credit card
defaults and bankruptcy filings); Durkin, supra note 47, at 38, fig. 3 (finding no correlation with
defaults on automobile loans and home mortgages).
168. Gross & Souleles, supra note 62, at 320.
169. These credit card debts may be presumed nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(C) as
fraudulently induced, but only if they aggregate to over $1225 within sixty days of bankruptcy
for "luxury goods and services." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2000). Such limits are easily
evaded, either by maxing out the card sixty-one days before bankruptcy, or charging
discretionary but nonluxury items prior to bankruptcy that would not be considered "luxury"
expenditures, such as discretionary car or house repairs.
170. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1081-84
(1998) (noting the correlation between credit card default and bankruptcy); Susan L. DeJamatt,
Once is Not Enough: PreservingConsumers'Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J.
455,499 (1999) (concluding that the credit card industry's choice to lend to people with weak
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empirical studies have failed to support this theory. As with consumers in
general, the growth in credit card debt among low-income households has been
primarily a substitution of credit cards for other types of credit, such as pawn
shops and payday lenders, not an overall increase in indebtedness. In fact,
empirical researchers have failed to find evidence that rising consumer
bankruptcies have been caused by extension of credit cards to less creditworthy borrowers, because the growth in credit card debt represents a
substitution from other forms of credit, not an expansion of overall consumer
indebtedness. 171
Thus, there is an observed correlation between credit card defaults and
bankruptcy, but the available evidence fails to provide an economic risk-based
explanation for the correlation. This anomaly suggests that those who believe
that the expansion of credit card use has contributed to rising bankruptcy filings
may be correct, but for the wrong reason. Credit cards have not increased
indebtedness and household financial distress, but instead have simply
substituted impersonal unsecured credit for more localized secured credit.
Because credit card debt is unsecured and dischargeable in bankruptcy, this
substitution has increased the benefits of filing bankruptcy, notwithstanding the
fact that overall consumer indebtedness has not increased.
B. GreaterNationalizationandImpersonalization of Consumer Credit
This trend in consumer credit has also led to increased bankruptcy filings
in a second way, by making consumer credit relations less "personal" in nature.
Although "greater impersonalization" of consumer credit is difficult to measure,
there is a widespread perception that credit relations, especially for consumer
credit, have become increasingly impersonal in recent years as compared to the
past. 72 This change in credit relations has affected the willingness of
credit histories is part of the problem); Bernard R. Trujillo, The Wisconsin Exemption Clause

Debate of 1846: An HistoricalPerspectiveon the Regulation of Debt, 1998 Wisc. L. REv. 747,

749 (1998) (noting that one reason for the explosion in bankruptcies is extension of credit to
subprime borrowers).
171. See Donald P. Morgan & Ian Toll, BadDebt Rising, CURRENT IssuEs INECON. & FIN.

Mar. 1997, at 1, 4 (finding "no evidence" that lending to riskier borrowers was the problem);
Gross & Souleles, supranote 62, at 344-46 (not finding lending to riskier borrowers to be a
factor in bankruptcy filing rates); see also Zywicki, EconomicAnalysis, supranote 1(discussing
empirical evidence). Consistent with the argument presented in the text here, Morgan and Toll

conclude that increased consumer demand for credit cards, relative to other forms of consumer

credit is driving the increase in credit card debt, not a supply-side shift by lenders. Morgan &
Toll, supra at 4.
172. Rafael Efrat, The MoralAppeal of PersonalBankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REv. 141,
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individuals to file bankruptcy in three different ways: (1) by undermining the
development of commercial trust relationships; (2) by undermining the
constraints imposed by repeat dealings; and (3) by reducing the constraints of
individual credit reputation.
Consumer credit was historically a highly personalized transaction, for
example, a comer grocery store or Main Street tailor selling goods to their
customers on credit.' 73 Bank credit, for instance, required the debtor to
Withstand a personal and intrusive series of face-to-face interviews and probing
inquiry into his social and business relationships to determine the debtor's
trustworthiness and reliability. In fact, historically, a major source of consumer
credit was informal loans between family members. 74 Traditional credit was of
a highly personal and face-to-face nature, and the credit relationship was
embedded within an ongoing economic and social relationship with the credit
issuer. Where the credit relationship is embedded in the context of a social and
economic relationship, it is more likely that a trust relationship will arise
75
between the parties.
Today, many consumer financial relations are conducted with large
interstate banks and South Dakota and Delaware based credit card issuers such
as Citibank and MBNA. Impersonal credit relations, such as dealing with these
institutional lenders, are less likely to evolve into high-trust relationships, and
these weaker extralegal constraints make individuals more willing to breach
those promises. 76 In part, this is because individuals do not tend to form trust
relationships with artificial entities, such as corporations, in the same way that
they do with other human beings. These economic exchange relations lack the
embedded personal and extended economic relations that characterize older and
more local forms of credit. Thus, an individual is less likely to feel himself
bound in a trust relationship with his credit card issuer than he would be if he
1 77
purchased a suit on store credit from his local tailor.
161-62 (1998); see also Braucher, supra note 26, at 564 (noting the perceived distinction
between owing friends or family and owing a credit card company).
173. See CALDER, supra note 126, at 37-42 (discussing the rise of retail credit).
174. Id. at 60-64 (discussing the role of family lending).
175. Efrat, MoralAppeal, supra note 172, at 159.
176. Id.
177. Id. This same analysis could apply to the development of trust relationships by
creditors, but the primary constraint on lender opportunism are contracts and other more formal
institutions, including legislation and regulation, as well as repeat-dealing and reputation
effects, thus trust seems much less relevant on the lender's side of the transaction. As Efrat
observes:
[A] consumer debtor is less likely to develop a trust relationship beyond the
deterrence-based level with a large credit card company. The consumer debtor is
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Indeed, as David Skeel observes, part of the impetus for the 1898
Bankruptcy Act was the concern of merchants who engaged in interstate
commerce that when debtors ran into financial trouble they "played favorites"
with their creditors, preferring "family members and local creditors, not the outof-state merchants." 178 Lower-trust relationships, therefore, are more prone to
opportunism than high-trust relationships.
Individuals psychologically evaluate transactions differently depending on
whether they are of a personalized or an impersonalized nature. The closer the
social connection between the trading partners is, the greater the likelihood that
the individuals will trust one another.1 79 The longer the parties have known
each other and the more integrated their social network, the more likely they are
to trust one another.' 80 Individuals also appear to be more likely to recognize
the positive-sum nature of personal relations marked by an ongoing reciprocity
of mutual advantage and vest these "win-win" relationships with positive moral
weight.' 81 By contrast, individuals tend to see impersonal relationships as zerosum in nature, 82 removing a psychological constraint on acting
opportunistically. 1
The growth of credit cards illustrates the trend toward more national and
impersonal credit. Prior to the widespread development and use of credit cards,
the American consumer economy was highly localized. Even if one was merely
traveling, it could be very difficult to get credit when necessary. In the past,
individuals had to make use of more indirect and costly means for proving their
creditworthiness to strangers. For instance, when Max Weber visited the
United States in 1904, he witnessed an adult baptism by immersion. 8 3 When
not likely to have any face-to-face contact with the institutional creditor. The
parties infrequently communicate, and when they do, they mainly use impersonal
channels such as a telephone. Furthermore, a courtship will not likely develop
between the parties. The parties are not likely to watch each other act in social
situations or observe each other in [a] variety of emotional states. Therefore, the
lack of personal bonding precludes most of these types of relationships from
developing into a knowledge-based credit trust relationship.
Id.

178.

SKEEL,

supra note 20, at 36.

179. See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Measuring Trust, 115 Q. J. EcoN. 811, 834 (2000)
(discussing the relationship between social ties and trust).
180. Id.
181. Vernon L. Smith, Reflections on Human Action After 50 Years, 19 CATO J.195,207
(1999).
182. Id.
183. See Jeremy Shearmur & Daniel B. Klein, Good Conduct in the GreatSociety: Adam
Smith and the Role of Reputation, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF
GOOD CONDUCT 29 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997) (describing Weber's report).
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he inquired as to why the individual sought baptism, he was informed that it
was so that he could open a bank.18 4 Because Baptist congregations conducted
in-depth character evaluations of individuals before admitting them as
members, "[a]dmission to the congregation [was] recognized as an absolute
guarantee of the moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those qualities
required in business matters."' 185 Thus, "[w]hen a sect member moved to a
different place, or if he was a traveling salesman, he carried the certificate of
his congregation with him and thereby found not only easy contact with sect
86
members but, above all, he found credit everywhere."
These informal means of establishing credit have been supplanted by
credit cards as a universal medium of credit. "The sects' inquiries into the
would-be member's probity are paralleled by the credit card company's
scrutiny of the would-be cardholders' credit record."' 187 Today, "[i]n a large and
anonymous society such as the United States, many people carry credit cards,
which speak for them to people with whom they have had no previous contact
88
and with whom they may well never be in contact again.'
This trend towards more impersonalized credit has increased the efficiency
of American consumer credit markets and expanded consumer choice in credit.
Prior to the nationalization of credit markets, rural consumers suffered from the
lack of competition among banks as issuers of credit.' 89 Small-town debtors
had limited ability to shop around to get competing offers of credit. Thus,
while a debtor might personally know the loan officer at the bank, in many
instances this personalized relationship came at the cost of reduced competition
and customer choice.' 90 On the other hand, the personalized nature of these
traditional lending relationships could give rise to subtle bias and even
discrimination. Reliance on impersonalized systems such as credit-scoring and
the like has substantially reduced racial and other improper bias from the
lending decision, thereby leading to an expansion of credit to traditionally
underserved individuals.19' Finally, the nationalization of credit has generated
184. Id.
185. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, quoted in
Shearmur & Klein, supra note 183, at 36.
186. Shearmur & Klein, supra note 183, at 36.
187. Id. at 41-42.
188. Idat4l.
189. See Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards,supranote 161, at 94-110 (discussing the
effect of a lack of competition on bank lending terms).
190. Consider in this context the dramatic difference between the availability of twentyfour hour customer service for credit card operations versus the lasting practice of "banker's
hours" for traditional deposit banks.
191.

See generally INFO. POLICY INST., THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT:

ACCESS,
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competition on a massive scale. For instance, there are currently over 6000
issuers of credit cards and barriers to entry are low. This has led to robust
competition in the credit card market, driving economic efficiency and proconsumer innovation. 92
The greater impersonalization of consumer credit has had dramatic
consequences by expanding customer choice and liberating customers from the
constraints of traditional credit choices. But this increasing impersonalization
of lending also tends to undermine the moral obligation that borrowers feel
toward lenders, thereby increasing the likelihood that the debtor would engage
in post-contractual opportunism to avoid repayment. Bankruptcy filers
acknowledge that although they generally feel guilty about not being able to
pay their debt to their creditors, "many had less guilt feelings about not paying
large creditors or creditors they did not know personally."1 93 Moreover, in
order to reduce debtor guilt regarding bankruptcy, lawyers distinguish between
personal moral obligations owed to family and friends, versus financial
obligations owed to credit card lenders and other abstract institutions.'94 Such a
distinction between debts owed to friends versus institutional lenders would not
have been as tenable in the past, when most credit was local in nature and often
bundled with retail transactions from a lender who was also a local merchant
and neighbor. This decline of the trust relationship between lenders and
borrowers may help to explain the increasing willingness to discharge these
contractual obligations through bankruptcy.
In addition to leading to a decrease in personal shame, there has also been
a reduction in the constraint imposed by repeat-dealing. Repeat dealing
constrains opportunistic behavior by holding out the prospect that the long-term
benefit from the maintenance of the relationship exceeds the gain that an
individual could make by acting opportunistically.' 95 Consumer borrowers
historically had limited credit options, primarily because of geographic
limitations on the number of credit issuers with whom the debtor could
reasonably interact. Traditionally, retail goods and credit were tied together,
such that a borrower who failed to pay his credit bills would be unable to

EFFICIENCY, & OPPORTUNITY (2003).

192.

See generally Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards,supra note 161.

193. Efrat, Evolution ofSocialNorms,supra note 94 (citing VISA, QUAITATIVE RESEARCH:
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 9 (1997)).
194. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (contrasting the moral issues

associated with borrowing from family and friends versus institutions).
195. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF Co-OPERATION (1984); Lester G.
Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J.BuS. 27 (1980).
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purchase goods on credit in the future. 96 It was also relatively more expensive
for debtors in prior eras to relocate to a new community to start over after-filing
bankruptcy. Given the small number of credit issuers, the debtor dared not
default, as it would be exceedingly difficult to obtain credit in the future. The
fact that the debtor was locked into repeat-dealing relationships with a
relatively small number of credit issuers with whom he would have to deal in
the future placed constraints on the willingness of the debtor to breach his
promises.
Today, by contrast, the multitude of options available to a former bankrupt
removes much of 'the constraint imposed by repeat-dealing. Although
bankruptcy filers will face some restriction on the number of creditors who will
lend to them and may have to pay somewhat higher credit terms, postbankruptcy debtors will find a relatively vibrant and competitive market for
borrowing. 197 Thus, a bankruptcy filer is not required to go back to the same
lenders with whom she previously dealt. This attenuates the constraint of
repeat-dealing relationships, thereby increasing the debtor's willingness to file
bankruptcy at the margin.
For similar reasons, these developments have attenuated the constraining
effects of reputation 98 Maintaining a reputation-based system of contract
enforcement also requires the maintenance of a system of ostracism, both for
the "defector," and also for any member who enters into later dealings with the
defector. 199 This willingness to punish a defector even at some cost to oneself
196. A similar system, albeit in a nonconsumer context, is described by Karen Clay in her
analysis of trade and credit in Mexican California in the 1840s. Karen Clay, Trade,Institutions,
and Credit, 34 EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 495, 505 (1997). See generally Karen
Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican California, 13 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 202 (1997). The uncoupling of the credit transaction from the retail transaction may also
have other unanticipated psychological consequences. When the debtor receives both goods
and credit from the same seller, there may be an obvious transactional connection that is absent
where the credit transaction is separated from the goods. The uncoupling of the credit
transaction from the goods that were purchased may weaken the borrower's sense of reciprocal
obligation by eliminating the obvious and direct causal nexus between the credit bill and what it
purchased. I have seen no evidence on this point, although it is a plausible hypothesis. I would
like to thank Professor Owen Jones for suggesting this observation.
197. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing post-bankruptcy credit
options).
198. Reputation in this context can be distinguished from repeat-dealing because the
discipline of repeat-dealing turns on the bilateral exchange between a specific borrower and
lender, whereas reputation includes monitoring and punishment by third-party lenders. For the
purposes of this article, sanctioning behavior by other consumers is labeled as "social norms" or
"social stigma" to distinguish it from the commercial reputation effects of third-party lenders.
199. I use the term "defector" here in the descriptive manner used in the game theory
literature to refer to a noncooperator, here the bankruptcy filer.
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(or to forego the benefits of trading with her) creates a public goods
problem that can lead to free riding by others who are benefited but do not
have to bear the cost themselves. 200 The willingness to punish someone
who fails to punish the initial party creates a second-order public goods
problem. Such punishment raises substantial collective action problems, as
it becomes necessary not only to monitor misbehavior by the original party,
but also to monitor the behavior of all the other members of the group to
ensure that they are not reneging on their independent promises to ostracize
those who cheat a member of the group. As the size of the group increases,
it becomes increasingly difficult to overcome these collective action
problems and to detect and punish those who fail to punish the original
defector.
This collective action problem explains, in part, the relative ease with
which bankruptcy filers today can find access to credit following
bankruptcy as compared to prior eras. Staten found, for instance, that
bankruptcy filers who reacquired credit were much more likely to obtain
credit from a new lender rather than a prebankruptcy lender.20 ' Whereas
lenders may prefer as a group to ostracize borrowers who file bankruptcy,
in practice each lender has an individual incentive to lend to a debtor who
files bankruptcy. Ironically, a debtor who files bankruptcy and receives a
discharge may be a relatively better credit risk than prior to filing
bankruptcy, because she cannot receive another discharge for six years.20 2
The expansion of home equity lending further reinforces this, because
many lenders will lend on collateral even if they would not extend
unsecured credit. Thus, each lender individually has a private incentive to
deal with a bankrupt at the right price, notwithstanding the fact
that lenders
20 3
as a group might prefer to "blackball" all bankruptcy filers.

200. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 8.5 (6th ed. 2003)
(discussing the free-rider problem that can arise in the enforcement of social norms).
201. Staten, supranote 91, at 12. Nor did it make a difference whether a debtor discharged
his debts in Chapter 7 or filed Chapter 13 and presumably attempted to repay some of his prepetition debts. Id. at 16.
202. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8) (2000).
203. This second-order punishment problem becomes more acute where the existing group
cannot restrain entry by new lenders who can enter the market to serve those subject to
ostracism at the hands of the incumbents. POSNER, supranote 200, § 8.5. Barriers to entry are
low in consumer credit markets, especially with the invention of nonbank finance companies,
and, in recent years, the greatest amount of entry appears to have occurred in the subprime
market, which specializes in lending to consumers with previous bankruptcies and tarnished
credit. Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, supra note 161, at 128-29.
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VI. What To Do About Rising Bankruptcies?

This Article has proposed a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in
the New Institutional Economics (NIE). It is argued that the upward trend line
in consumer bankruptcy filing rates over the past two decades has resulted from
a confluence of three general factors: (1) a change in the relative costs and
benefits of filing bankruptcy; (2) a change in the social norms traditionally
associated with filing bankruptcy; and (3) changes in the consumer credit
market that have eroded the informal institutions of trust, repeat-dealing, and
commercial reputation. Available empirical evidence tends to support the
model, but further testing will be necessary before reaching a final conclusion.
Assuming that the NIE model of bankruptcy advanced here is correct,
what, if anything, does this say about appropriate reforms to the consumer
bankruptcy system? By synthesizing academic research and turning it into
applied legislative reform, the traditional model of consumer bankruptcy
provided the intellectual foundation for the 1978 Code.2° Similarly, the NIE
model of consumer bankruptcy described in this Article provides a conceptual
foundation for many of the legislative reforms included in the recently-enacted
bankruptcy reform legislation.
This Part briefly reviews possible policy implications of the model
described here.20 5 In particular, three lines of policy reforms are examined.
First, amendments are proposed to the bankruptcy reform legislation that would
reorient the relative costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy.
Second, policy initiatives are suggested that are designed to reverse or
compensate for the change in social norms that has reduced bankruptcy's
stigma. Finally, I will briefly explore the implications of the model here
regarding fundamental reforms proposed by some scholars, such as eliminating
the mandatory fresh-start provision of current law and instead reformulating the
fresh start as a default rule that can be waived by the debtor.
A. Adjust the Relative Costs andBenefits of Filing Bankruptcy
The first and most direct policy response to rising bankruptcy filings
would be to rebalance the benefits and costs associated with filing bankruptcy.
Increasing the costs associated with filing bankruptcy, however, would not be
204. See generally SKEEL, supranote 20.
205. 1 have addressed these policy arguments in more detail elsewhere and just provide a
brief overview here. See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform: An Economic
Analysis (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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appropriate, in that increasing the deadweight cost of learning about and filing
bankruptcy would advance no valuable policy goal.20 6 The goal of the
bankruptcy system should be to deliver relief to those who are thought to
deserve it, while limiting its use by others. Increasing the transaction costs of
filing bankruptcy surely would reduce bankruptcy filings, but this would
advance no coherent policy goal.20 7 Thus, the focus should be on decreasing
the benefits associated with bankruptcy, especially to high-income and highwealth debtors who could repay a substantial portion of their debts in
bankruptcy, but choose not to.
Several of the provisions in the BAPCPA are designed to reduce some of
the benefits associated with filing bankruptcy. To reduce the attractiveness of
bankruptcy for high-income debtors, the bankruptcy reform legislation will
"means-test" eligibility of bankruptcy filers for Chapter 7 relief.20 8 Under
means-testing, a debtor will be required to file in Chapter 13 rather than
Chapter 7, if she: (1) earns above the state median income; (2) could repay a
substantial portion of her debts out of "disposable income" in Chapter 13 after
subtracting out a slate of allowed expenses; and (3) does not have significant
special circumstances that offset the presumption of a Chapter 13 filing. As a
substantive matter, means-testing simply institutionalizes the "substantial
abuse" (now "abuse") inquiry of § 707(b), and invigorates enforcement of that
moribund provision by shifting the burden of persuasion in cases where the
concern about abuse is highest.20 9 A debtor who is means-tested into Chapter
13 thus would not be denied a discharge on account of triggering the meanstesting provisions of the Code; she would simply have her discharge
conditioned on completing a court approved Chapter 13 plan and paying off
what she can to unsecured creditors.
It is estimated that approximately 7%-10% of current bankruptcy filers
would satisfy all elements of the means-test under the legislation and be
206. Unless, of course, the increased costs were just a by-product of reforms for which the
benefits exceeded the costs. For instance, proposals to reduce fraud and abuse could have small
costs associated with them, but have substantial offsetting benefits.
207. For instance, we could have a rule of randomly dismissing every tenth bankruptcy
filing, which would reduce filings, but would accomplish no coherent policy goal.
208. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 102, 119 Stat. 23, 29-35. A
detailed examination of the means-testing provisions of the bankruptcy reform legislation is
provided in Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208, on which this subpart draws. See also
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCOMPANY H.R.
333, BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2001, at 2 (2001)
("The heart of H.R. 333's consumer bankruptcy reforms is the implementation of an
income/expense screening mechanism ('needs-based bankruptcy relief) to ensure that debtors
repay creditors the maximum they can afford.").
209. See Jones & Zywicki, supranote 3, at 181-208 (discussing means-testing in depth).
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required to file in Chapter 13 .210 Because the means-test targets those with the
highest repayment capacity, this would result in a substantial repayment of debt
currently discharged in bankruptcy.21 Under current law, by contrast, because
of exemptions and prebankruptcy planning, there is no distribution at all to
general unsecured creditors in 96% of Chapter 7 cases and only a trivial
distribution in other cases. 2 12 Recovering some of this discharged debt through
means-testing would reduce bankruptcy losses and, therefore, the cost to
lenders. In turn, some of these savings would be passed on to consumers in
terms of lower interest rates, lower credit costs generally, and greater benefits to
consumers. Because little is known about the exact elasticity of supply and
demand for consumer credit, it is not clear how much of these savings would be
passed on to consumers in the form of lower credit costs and increased benefits,
as opposed to increasing creditors' return on assets.2 13
In addition, the bankruptcy reform legislation amends the Code to reduce
the benefits of bankruptcy to high-wealth debtors.214 The incentives of highwealth debtors to file bankruptcy results primarily from real property
exemptions and exceptions of certain personal property from the bankruptcy
estate, such as ERISA-qualified pension plans. 215 Given the increasing ability
of debtors to act strategically to transfer assets to exempt and excepted sources
as part of prebankruptcy planning activities, it may be appropriate to give new
210. Id. at 184.
211. One estimate concluded that means-tested debtors could repay 64% of their unsecured
nonpriority debts, or over $4 billion, in addition to all of their priority and secured debts. Id. at
187 (citing Tom Neubig & Fritz Scheuren, Ernst & Young, Chapter 7 BankruptcyPetitioners'
Ability to Repay: The NationalPerspective, 1997, at 8 (Mar. 1998)).
212. Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The
DistributionofAssets in Chapter7 BankruptcyProceedingsClosed in 1984-1987,22 U. RICH.
L. REV. 303, 315-16 (1988); see also Michelle J. White, PersonalBankruptcy Under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 38-39 (1987) (estimating average
repayment rate of one to two percent in Chapter 7 cases).
213. See Kartik B. Athreya, Welfare Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999,
49 J. MONETARY ECON. 1567, 1583 (2002) (estimating that means-testing would reduce credit
costs to households by approximately $80 per year).
214. In addition, Congress could improve safeguards against outright fraud, such as
concealing assets. The FBI estimates that roughly 10% of bankruptcy filings have some sort of
fraud, usually asset concealment. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BANKRUPTCY FRAUD, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/videotext/bf txt.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2005). Although
greater safeguards would reduce the benefits of filing bankruptcy for fraudulent filers, this is
sufficiently obvious that it is not discussed in the text. Nonetheless, many of the provisions in
the bankruptcy reform legislation accomplish this purpose.
215. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2000); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992)
(ruling that a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan may be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate).
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statutory and equitable tools to judges, enabling them to reduce these benefits
by limiting the amount of property that bankruptcy filers can protect through
bankruptcy exemptions.
The notorious unlimited homestead exemption available in a handful of
states has come in for special criticism in this context, especially in the popular
press. 216 Other exemptions under state law are potentially subject to abuse as
well, but, in practice, courts have been more deferential to protecting large
amounts of wealth in homestead exemptions than in other forms of unlimited or
high-value exemptions.217 Even less common is the concern that bankruptcy
debtors will relocate on the eve of bankruptcy in order to take advantage of
other states' unlimited homestead exemption. 218 Nonetheless, the homestead
exemption is symbolically important and, even though the tangible benefits of
greater limits on homestead are relatively small given the relatively small
number of affected filers, the marginal costs of reform are small as well.219
Reducing the amount of wealth that can be protected in a Chapter 7 filing by
reducing bankruptcy exemptions would also tend to cause a substitution by
filers from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, which might increase returns to creditors
and reduce some of the benefits of filing bankruptcy. 220 There is also a high
correlation between income and wealth; thus, means-testing high-income
debtors into Chapter 13 will reduce some of the benefits of bankruptcy even to
those who retain large homestead exemptions.
A potentially larger problem arises from the interaction of rising housing
values during recent decades, the operation of the homestead exemption, and
the blossoming of home equity lending markets. By increasing accumulated
home equity, increases in home values also increase the effective value of the
homestead exemption to potential filers. Through prebankruptcy planning, a
debtor can strategically increase her home equity by paying down her home
216. For a comprehensive analysis of the empirical and political debates regarding
homestead exemptions, see generally G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy
Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227 (2000).
217. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 8-32 (1993).
218. See Ronel Elul & Narayanan Subramaniam, Forum-Shopping and Personal
Bankruptcy (Brown Univ., Dep't of Econs., Working Paper No. 99-1, 1999) (finding that a
small number of individuals relocate from low-exemption to high-exemption states for purposes
of filing bankruptcy), availableat http://people.brandeis.edu/-nsubra/wp/forum.pdf; Vukowich,
supra note 18, at 1139-42 (noting the small number of filers benefited by unlimited homestead
exemption).
219. See supranotes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the homestead
exemption on bankruptcy filings).
220. See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinantsof the ConsumerBankruptcy
Decision, 54 J. FIN. 403,404 (1999) (discussing the effect of the exemption level on the choice
of Chapter 7 or Chapter 13).

1126

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1071 (2005)

mortgage at the expense of her unsecured creditors and then discharge her
unsecured debt in bankruptcy. Following bankruptcy, the debtor will likely be
able to gain credit on a home equity loan, secured by the equity that was
accumulated prior to filing bankruptcy. Because the loan is secured rather than
unsecured, a typical middle-class debtor with substantial accumulated home
equity will likely be able to obtain a home equity loan on competitive terms.
As a result, a sophisticated debtor can essentially "launder" pre-petition money
to herself post-petition, by combining the homestead exemption with a postbankruptcy home equity loan.2 21
The proposed bankruptcy reform legislation would eliminate several of the
most egregious forms of abuse. First, any debtor who moved from a state with
a limited exemption to a state with an unlimited exemption would face a twoyear waiting period before she could avail herself of the new state's
exemptions 222 and all filers will face a new cap on any homestead acquired
within forty months prior to bankruptcy, regardless of whether the debtor
relocated from another state.223 These waiting periods eliminate the
opportunity for a debtor to relocate on the eve of bankruptcy in order to gain
the benefits of a more generous homestead exemption. Notably, this would
prevent individuals such as O.J. Simpson from relocating to a new state such as
Florida in order to take advantage of Florida's unlimited homestead
exemption.2 24 Second, provisions in the reform act also would potentially allow
victims of securities and other financial fraud to reach the homestead assets of
individuals such as Scott Sullivan, the former WorldCom executive who owns
a $15 million homestead outside Boca Raton, Florida. 225 Third, the legislation
would permit a ten-year statute of limitations for claims that a debtor had
226
ainde o
fraudulently manipulated her homestead exemption. The legislation does not
impose a flat cap on the amount of equity a debtor can protect in his homestead
227
By
exemption, a decision that arguably is justified by federalism concerns.
221. Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Code, Not the Scriptures: Protectinga
Debtor's Right to Tithe in Bankruptcy, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1223, 1264-65 (1998).
222. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 307, 119 Stat. 23.
223. Id. § 322.
224. Stephen Frater, Home $weet Home, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., May31,2004, at A12.
225. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 322, 119 Stat. 23 (capping
value of homestead exemption against claims of fraud, securities fraud, and other intentional
harms at $125,000 if acquired within 1215 days of bankruptcy). It is not clear when exactly
Sullivan acquired his Florida homestead. Frater reports the value as $15 million, which served
as collateral on Sullivan's $10 million bail bond for his criminal securities fraud prosecution.
Frater, supra note 224, at 12.
226. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 308, 119 Stat. 23.
227. It can be argued that this decision is defensible in that it appears that most of the cost
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preventing forum-shopping and fraudulent use of the homestead exemption, the
legislation eliminates the most glaring abuses of current law.
As noted above, there also appears to be a rising number of cases where
debtors file bankruptcy despite possessing substantial retirement savings.228
The caselaw results are mixed on the willingness of judges to police this
behavior and to dismiss these filings. Certainly, judges could be more
consistently vigilant in reviewing and dismissing cases where debtors possess
very substantial exempt retirement savings. Unfortunately, the bankruptcy
reform legislation would actually move the law in the opposite direction, by
creating greater protections for retirement savings.229 Ideally, this safe harbor
should be struck from the legislation, although it was added some time ago in
response to an earlier proposal to codify greater restrictions on the exemption of
retirement savings.
More fundamentally, by reducing abuse and by reducing the public
perception of widespread abuse of the system, bankruptcy reform will tend to
increase support for the bankruptcy system as a whole. 230 By reserving
bankruptcy relief for those who need it and preventing abuse by those who do
not, the reform measures discussed will increase public confidence that the
system is operating properly to forgive those who need it. Measured reforms to
reduce abuse, therefore, may help to head off more sweeping changes later that
would attack opportunistic and legitimate bankruptcy filers equally.
B. Reversing the Change in Social Norms
Societal patterns of cooperation or noncooperation usually develop over
long periods of time and can be very difficult to change. "Trust and distrust
associated with generous state exemption policies are borne by other consumers within the state,
in terms of less access to credit, lower loan approval rates, and higher interest rates, than for
residents of states with lower exemption rates. See generally Gropp et al., supra note 44.
Historically, the purpose of homestead exemptions has been to protect family farmers, who are
unlikely to relocate on the eve of bankruptcy. Both the benefits and costs of a state's homestead
exemption policy remain mainly within the state and do not spillover onto residents of other
jurisdictions, thus this policy choice arguably is protected by federalism principles. As a result,
the statutory waiting periods imposed by the legislation permits creditors to adjust to the higher
risk of a debtor's move to a more generous state.
228. See supranotes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy cases involving
retirement savings).
229. Bankruptcy Reform Legislation of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 244, 119 Stat. 23.
230. Cf Posner, supranote 100, at 1814-19 (noting that transparent tax shelters and other
obvious abuses of the tax system undermine faith in the fairness and integrity of the tax system
and thereby reduce voluntary compliance).
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feed upon each other," Matt Ridley observes. 23 1 "Stocks of social capital, such
as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative.
Vicious circles result in social equilibriums with high levels of cooperation,
trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and collective well-being. These traits
define the civic community," writes Robert Putnam. 232 "Conversely," he
continues, "the absence of these traits in the uncivic community is also selfreinforcing. Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and
2 33
stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles.
Thus, undermining habits of reciprocity in commercial exchange will tend to
erode the values of reciprocity and trust in social, economic, and political
relations.234
The vicious-cycle characteristic of negative changes in social norms, as
well as the diffuse nature of evolution of norms, makes it difficult to identify
particular policy proposals that could reverse the deterioration of social norms
regarding bankruptcy. 235 Few theorists have provided persuasive prescriptions
as to how to build social trust or to reverse a decline in social trust.236 In fact,
there may be little that law can do to reverse these sorts of large social
movements. According to the "expressive" theory of law, however, legal rules
can shape social norms at the margin. The bankruptcy reform legislation
contains several provisions that would be consistent with a goal of reinstating
some of the traditional social norms regarding bankruptcy. For instance, it
requires a debtor to seek mandatory consumer credit counseling in order to try
to work out a voluntary repayment plan with creditors before she can file for
237
bankruptcy, which will tend to reinforce the value of voluntary repayment.
231. RIDLEY,supra note 112, at 250.
232. ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS INMODERN ITALY
177 (1993).

233.

Id.

234. Frank Buckley refers to this effect as creating "distrust externalities." F. H. Buckley,
The Debtoras Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1078, 1086 (2002).
235. I assume for purposes of this discussion the desirability of reinstating traditional social
norms regarding bankruptcy and leave aside normative arguments about the desirability of this
policy goal.
236. See generally Stephen Knack & Paul J. Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy,
Interpersonal Trust, and Economic Development, 10 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 91 (2003)
(identifying public policies that can build social trust).
237. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 106, 119 Stat. 23. This
provision has been part of all of the various iterations of the bankruptcy reform legislation over
the past several years and has been widely supported, even by critics of bankruptcy reform
generally. See SKEEL, supranote 20, at 207-08 ("From the earliest days of the [reform] debate,
the bankruptcy legislation included provisions requiring every debtor to submit to credit
counseling before filing for bankruptcy, and again after the conclusion of the bankruptcy
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The means-testing provisions, which require high-income debtors to repay a
substantial portion of their debts if they can do so without significant hardship,
would send a powerful social message regarding the importance of living up to
financial obligations to the best of one's ability.238 Although not part of the
current reform proposals, it also may be worthwhile to reconsider the decision
of the 1978 Code to de-stigmatize bankruptcy and to de-emphasize the moral
qualities of bankruptcy by resuscitating the traditional term "bankrupt" and
reconsidering the broad prohibition against discrimination against bankruptcy
filers currently found in the Code.239
In addition to trying to reverse the atrophy of social norms, it may also be
efficient to simply acknowledge this fact, and propose amendments to formal
legal institutions that correct for these changes. Much of the decline in social
norms regarding bankruptcy is an inevitable outgrowth of the increasing
complexity and mobility of modem society. Trying to reverse these trends in
social norms, therefore, may not be practical. Instead, it may be more
promising to update formal institutions to serve as "trust substitutes" that can
take the place of weakening social norms.
24
There is an interaction between formal and informal institutions. 0
Formal institutions can be either a complement to or substitute for informal
institutions. 41 For instance, informal measures such as reputation, repeatdealing, and interpersonal trust can be a substitute for formal rules of contract
enforcement.242 Stuart Macaulay's classic study of commercial relations in
business and the minimal reliance placed on written contracts illustrates the

case."); id.
at 208 (describing comments of Professor Karen Gross and lawyer Henry Sommer).
On the other hand, some have criticized this requirement as unnecessarily increasing the cost
and complexity of seeking bankruptcy relief. Id.; see also David Wessel, The MuddledCourse
of Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2001, at AI (quoting Professor David Skeel).
238. See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 207 (discussing the benefits of means-testing).
239. See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (discussing the prohibition of
discrimination in the 1978 Code).
240. Some economists have remarked on the interaction between formal institutions and
informal norms and practices in policing opportunism in the context of corporate bankruptcy.
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INsTITUTIONs OF CAPIrALISM 122 (1985) (noting
that in Japan "[t]he hazards of trading are less severe.., because of cultural and institutional
checks on opportunism"); Marc Ramseyer, Sanctions Without Law: The JapaneseFinancial
ClearinghouseGuillotineand Its Impact on DefaultRates, in REPUTATION, supranote 183, at
225. On the other hand, there has been little discussion of the interaction between formal and
informal institutions in the context of consumer bankruptcy.
241. See Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv.553,555-56(2001) (suggesting that
law substitutes for, rather than complements, trust).
242. POSNER, supranote 200, § 4.1.
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point.243 Similarly, the traditional reluctance of the common law to intervene in
contracts made among family members reflects the implicit judgment that
formal legal enforcement of these promises adds little to their efficient level of
enforcement beyond that provided by informal extralegal enforcement of family
ties.244 On the other hand, where informal institutions are weak, legal
enforcement of promises can increase their reliability, providing greater
opportunities for efficient reliance. As philosopher Robert Goodin states,
"[t]hrough the institutions of contract law, private promises are publicly
enforced. Public sanctions can in that way substitute for private honor, and
trust in the public institutions might therefore substitute for trust in private
' 245
individuals. ,
Increasing complexity of economic exchange tends to drive the institutions
governing exchange to greater reliance on more formal and abstract
institutions. 246 As anthropologist Sally Merry has observed, "[W]ith increasing
social complexity, informal social controls diminish in significance and are
replaced by formal mechanisms of social control." 247 The development of
credit bureaus in the United States illustrates the evolution of more formal
institutions as trust substitutes when commercial exchange becomes more
complex. 248 Credit records were initially proprietary, consisting of one
243. See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (discussing the limited reliance that business
places on contracts).
244. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1272-73 (1980) (discussing promise enforcement
among family members).
245. Robert E. Goodin, Trusting Individuals Versus Trusting Institutions: Generalizing
the Case of Contract, 12 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 381, 382 (2000).
246. See generally NORTH,supra note 13; see also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial
Law in the Cotton Industry: CreatingCooperationThrough Rules, Norms, andInstitutions,99
MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1749-50 (2001) (noting increased reliance on formal institutions in
response to a decline in "Old South" norms of the Memphis cotton exchange).
247. Sally E. Merry, Rethinking Gossip andScandal, in TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF
SOCIAL CONTROL 271, 288 (Donald Black ed., 1984); see also Daniel B. Klein, Promise
Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of CreditInformation Sharing,4 ECON. & POL. 117
(1992), reprintedin REPUTATION, supra note 183, at 267, 271. A similar evolution towards
governance by more formal institutions characterizes the evolution of national courts and formal
contract law. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Evolution of Contract Governance (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
248. See Daniel B. Klein, Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, By Voluntary Means, in
REPUTATION, supranote 183, at 1, 3-7; Daniel B. Klein, CreditInformation Reporting: Why
Free Speech is Vital to Social Accountability and Consumer Opportunity, available at
http://lsb.scu.edu/faculty/creditreporting.html ("The histories of other social accountability
mechanisms show a similar pattern of development-from informal gossip to local associations
to efficient integrated systems serving a great society."). See generallyKlein, PromiseKeeping,
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merchant's records about borrower's accounts. These proprietary records,
however, did little to constrain opportunism, as borrowers could simply jump
from one creditor to another, taking advantage of each in turn. Merchants and
lenders eventually came to "pool" their information, formally and informally,
allowing a more complete report on each potential borrower and a more robust
system of reporting on reputation. Through this process, the first credit bureaus
were born. They were local in scope originally, relegated to a single city or
town.249 Over time, however, these local credit bureaus pooled their available
information into larger regional and finally national credit reporting bureaus.
Today there are three major national credit bureaus, with a variety of regional
and industry-specific bureaus as well. 250 The development of national credit
bureaus with standardized reporting replaced more informal institutions of
word-of-mouth gossip and local credit reporting. This increasing formalization
of consumer credit reporting both reflects and maintains national consumer
credit markets.25'
Where informal institutions weaken, the efficient response historically has
been to devise these formal "trust substitutes" to supplement and replace them.
The logic of creating new institutional "trust substitutes" is the animating logic
of BAPCPA. Innovations such as means-testing, mandatory consumer credit
counseling, and the like, can be understood as efforts to develop institutional
substitutes for the declining influence of social norms that traditionally
eschewed bankruptcy and encouraged debt repayment.
C. ContractingAround Bankruptcy
In addition to the more gradual reforms proposed by the bankruptcy
reform legislation, some scholars have suggested the possibility of more radical
long-run reform, such as permitting consumers to opt-out of bankruptcy by
25 2 Under this
allowing contractual waiver of the right to file bankruptcy.
proposal, the right to elect bankruptcy would no longer be a mandatory rule, but
rather would be a default rule that debtors could elect to waive by contract. In
supra note 247; Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit
Reporting in America (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 02-21, 2002);
Macaulay, supranote 243.
249. Hunt, supra note 248, at 8-9.
250. Id.
251. Marco Pagano & Tulio Jappelli, Information Sharing in Credit Markets, 43 J. FIN.
1693, 1713-14(1993).
252. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 41, at 609 (suggesting that the ability to contract
around bankruptcy should be given consideration).
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exchange for waiving the right to file bankruptcy ex post, the debtor
presumably would gain access to credit on better terms ex ante. The costs of
the mandatory bankruptcy discharge provision are substantial--one estimate
places it at roughly $280 per year per household and an increase in interest
rates on unsecured credit of 3.2%; others place the cost as high as $900.253

Moreover, these costs will generally have their greatest impact on marginal
borrowers-young lower-income, lower-wealth borrowers who are most likely
to be turned down for credit as the cost and risk rises, who can least afford to
pay higher credit costs, and who have the fewest number of credit options. In
addition, because these borrowers will have accumulated lower household
wealth holdings, they will be the most dependent on unsecured credit, which is
most likely to be adversely affected by increases in credit costs. Middle class
borrowers, by contrast, will be more likely to hold homes and cars, and
therefore to substitute the use of secured credit for unsecured credit as the cost
of unsecured credit rises.
The consumer bankruptcy model described here does provide some
support for the proposition that the right to a discharge should be a waiveable
default rule, rather than a mandatory term. The model indicates that some part
of an individual's decision to file bankruptcy is a function of the strength of her
moral and psychological commitment to performing her contractual obligations
rather than filing bankruptcy. This particular information is private,
idiosyncratic, and not observable or subject to third-party verification.
Nonetheless, it is relevant information in determining the economic risk of a
loan. As a result, if this information could be accurately and credibly disclosed
to the market through signaling, it would permit a more efficient risk-based
pricing, allowing those with a stronger commitment to paying their debts and
living within their means to obtain more credit on less-expensive terms. 5
Because of the mandatory discharge of the current system, however, the ability
to credibly provide this information to the market is limited.
Making the discharge optional, rather than mandatory, would reduce this
problem of asymmetric information by enabling credible signaling to the
market of one's private information regarding personal reliability and
psychological commitment to repaying debts and thus one's lower risk. By
agreeing to waive the discharge, the debtor could signal his commitment to
repaying that debt, even if he might otherwise be able to discharge it in
bankruptcy. Moreover, because this action would be costly to the debtor, it
253. Athreya, supranote 213, at 1569.
254. See generallyAlan Schwartz, Security Interestsand BankruptcyPriorities:A Review
of the Current Theories, 10 J.LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993) (discussing argument that secured credit is

a similar signaling device).
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would provide a credible signal that would be difficult to fake. 255 As a result,
the willingness to waive the bankruptcy discharge with respect to certain debts
could allow more accurate pricing of loan terms in the market. Agreeing to
waive the discharge would permit trustworthy debtors to reveal private
information to the market about the reliability of their characters, while making
it difficult for less-trustworthy debtors to do the same.
Historical justification for the primacy ofthe "no waiver" rule in American
bankruptcy law is surprisingly thin. The development of a voluntary,
mandatory, andhighly-generous fresh start has existed only since the enactment
of the 1978 Code, and even that commitment was scaled back by the 1984
amendments. As noted, BAPCPA conditions the generosity of the bankruptcy
exemption still further. During the Nineteenth Century, bankruptcy backed by
a fresh start was the exception rather than the rule, as state law was frequently
invoked to permit a stay or reordering of consumer debts but not to permit a
discharge. The purpose of the Federal Bankruptcy power in Article I, Section 8
of the U.S. Constitution was in part to increase the ability of creditors to collect
on debts from out-of-state borrowers and to offset excessively pro-debtor state
discharge lawsi'ather than to enlarge debtors' rights to a discharge.256 In fact,
it remains unclear whether this provision of the Constitution even provided
Congress with the power to enact laws governing consumer insolvency, as
opposed to business bankruptcy. 257 Moreover, the generosity of the current
American bankruptcy system is unique not only in American history, but also in
the world. 258 European countries have far less-generous fresh-start policies
255. It may be objected that creditors could "force" debtors into waiving their discharge
involuntarily. This objection, however, is not very plausible. First, as noted earlier, consumer
credit markets today are extremely competitive, and consumers have the ability to shop among
many different lenders offering many different terms. Second, unsecured creditors today could
theoretically "force" debtors to give them a security interest for any loan made. In fact, lenders
do not and cannot impose security interests on debtors, and there is no reason to believe that
they will be any more successful in forcing debtors to waive their discharge.
256. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Bankruptcy Clause, in THE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION
(forthcoming 2005).
257. It has been argued that the use of the term "Bankruptcies" in the Constitution invoked
a term of art from English law, which distinguished between "bankruptcy" proceedings
involving merchant debtors on one hand, and consumer "insolvency" proceedings on the other.
Unlike the former, "insolvency" proceedings generally did not result in a discharge of the
individual debtor, but rather a repayment plan designed to enable the debtor to repay his debts
and thereby avoid debtor's prison.
258. See Feibelman, supra note 88 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author);
Rafael Efrat, Global Trends in PersonalBankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 81, 82-91 (2002)
(discussing the prevalence of the fresh start policy globally). See generally Hung-Jen Want &
Michelle J. White, An Optimal Bankruptcy Procedureand Proposed Reforms, 29 J. LEGAL
STUDS. 255 (2000) (discussing an efficient or optimal bankruptcy model and proposing reforms
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than does the United States, and countries such as Japan still less so. Thus, the
mandatory, generous fresh start policy that characterizes current American
bankruptcy law is anomalous in both American and world history, suggesting
that it is worth considering either narrowing the fresh start (as described above)
or eliminating its mandatory character.
The idiosyncratic character of America's current fresh start policy also
raises doubts about the theoretical justifications that have been offered in
defense of it. Tom Jackson, for instance, has explained the fresh start policy as
a response to inherent limitations on individual cognition and borrower overoptimism.259 But if the justification rests in inherent limits on human foresight,
it seems unlikely that American law would be unique in implicitly recognizing
this fact in its bankruptcy laws. Even in the United States, it is difficult to see
why the recognition of this fact would have taken over 200 years before the
1978 Code; even then, the expansive fresh start in the 1978 Code was quickly
conditioned by the 1984 amendments that added the "substantial abuse"
provision of Section 707(b).2 6 ° Instead, it would be expected that if the fresh
start is justified by inherent psychological limits on human foresight, then
presumably this aspect of human nature would have manifested itself in other
legal systems around the world and at a much earlier date in the United
States. 26 1 This circumstantial evidence suggests that Jackson's conclusion that
the mandatory fresh-start policy is efficient in light of human cognitive limits is
incorrect. Instead, the universal prevalence of a more restrictive fresh start
policy, both in American history and throughout the world, actually implies the
opposite, that America is unique and that the universally-adopted rule is likely
to be more efficient than America's unique, outlier system. 262 Similar problems
plague all other justifications for a mandatory fresh start policy, whether
to the bankruptcy code).
259. Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1393, 1394-95 (1985).
260. See SKEEL, supra note 20, at 187-97 (describing the lead up to the 1984
amendments).
261. See Zywicki, Reciprocity Instinct, supra note 157 (arguing that a universal
characteristic of human nature and cognition should lead to the evolution of universal norms
and legal rules).
262. See generally A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of Tradition'sRole in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409
(1999) (arguing that one can draw inferences of efficiency, consent, and wisdom from universal
adoption of certain legal rules that evolve over long periods of time through decentralized
processes). Indeed, one effect of the bankruptcy reform legislation would be to move the United
States closer to the world norm regarding the scope of the bankruptcy discharge. See Todd J.
Zywicki, The Past,Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in America, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2016, 2034-35 (2003) (noting that bankruptcy laws globally appear to be converging).
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265
264
grounded in ethics, 263 communitarianism, or traditional economic analysis.
In each case, the effort to provide a universal justification for America's fresh
start runs up against the fact that the recent American fresh start policy is
simply idiosyncratic and presumably stands as an exception to any general
theory of the bankruptcy discharge, rather than illustrating a general principle.
Given the absence of a compelling historical or theoretical justification for
the current fresh start policy, the balance struck in the 1978 Code thus appears
to be little more than conventional, based on a crude cost-benefit analysis and
drawing on idiosyncratic elements of American history and political balances
struck at the time. 266 In other words, there is nothing "sacred" or inherently
logical about the particular balance that American bankruptcy law struck at that
time, and that balance should be subject to reassessment in light of changes in
society, the economy, and new information. As I have noted elsewhere, the
1978 Code rests on a particular intellectual foundation about the causes of
consumer bankruptcy filings.267 As such, it also contains implicit assumptions
about the relative costs and benefits of the current fresh start policy. To the
extent that model no longer accurately explains consumer bankruptcy filings,
this also casts doubt on the cost-benefit analysis that justifies the current
regime.

VII. Conclusion
Recent research has found that the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings
over the past twenty-five years has been caused by an increasing propensity of
households to file bankruptcy in response to financial shocks, rather than
worsening household financial condition. This Article has offered a model of
the consumer bankruptcy process that can explain these trends. Although the

263. See generally Peter C. Alexander, With Apologies to C.S. Lewis: An Essay on
Dischargeand Forgiveness, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 601 (2000).
264. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY
469-75 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the rational for the fresh start policy, particularly with
reference to the effect of bankruptcy on the debtor's community).
265. See generally Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 51 (2002).
266. Zywicki, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 262, at 2017; see also Todd J.
Zywicki, Book Review, Rescuing Business: The Making of CorporateLaw in Englandandthe
UnitedStates, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 361,362-63 (2000) (noting the political influences involved
in the 1978 Code). See generally BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING
BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF CORPORATE LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1998).
267. See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
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empirical evidence to support the model is still early in its development, it
generally tends to support the model. More empirical research should be done.
This Article is the first word, not the last, in the effort to develop and test a
model of the consumer bankruptcy process. Dramatic changes have
transformed the consumer bankruptcy system over the past twenty-five years;
nonetheless, the current system remains largely unaltered and unresponsive to
this revolution. Most research for the past several decades has been designed
around the traditional model of consumer bankruptcy. This Article calls for a
new era in consumer bankruptcy scholarship that will help to understand the
world we observe today, rather than that of the past.
The model proposed here has served as the animating model for the
recently enacted bankruptcy reform legislation, dramatically amending the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, which was predicated on an older and no longer valid model
of the individual bankruptcy filing decision. As times have changed, the
Bankruptcy Code has also changed to meet the new challenges presented by the
economy and culture of modem America.

NOTES

